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I met Roberta Green1 in 1998 when I was a student attorney with the
Family Defense Clinic at New York University School of Law. Ms.
Green contacted our clinic seeking an attorney to challenge the state‘s
termination of her parental rights. Like many parents in her situation,
Ms. Green wished to prove the she was capable of being a parent to her
son. Unlike many parents in her situation, however, she was drug-free,
gainfully employed, and had stable housing. In addition, Ms. Green‘s
teenage son opposed the termination and was currently living with her.
Without any assistance from the state, she had been providing for him
for nearly two years.
Based on these facts, any state would have had difficulty terminating
her parental rights. However, Ms. Green was not seeking legal assistance
to defend against the termination. She wanted an attorney to restore the
rights that had been taken from her nearly ten years prior. Ms. Green,
now thirty-nine years old, wanted the state to recognize that she was
both the biological and legal parent to her nineteen-year-old son.
Ms. Green is one of a growing number of parents who do not allow
the finality of the court‘s termination order to discourage them from
rehabilitating and seeking reunification with their children. Many of
these parents have maintained relationships with their children even after
the state has determined that they are not fit to parent them. As in Ms.
Green‘s case, most must wait until the child exits foster care without a
permanent home before they can resume parenting. Most states do not
provide a means for them to restore their parental rights; however, when
given the opportunity, many parents like Ms. Green can prove that they
have overcome the barriers that led to the termination, and that it is in
the best interest of their children for them to be ―resurrected.‖
INTRODUCTION
Despite federal and state legislation that encourage the termination
of parental rights when a child has remained in foster care for a specified
period of time,2 studies indicate that relationships with their biological
1

Name has been changed.
Two major pieces of federal foster care legislation, the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272 (1980) (―AACWA‖) and the
Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89 (1997) (―ASFA‖) were
2
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parents (and other relatives) remain important to children in foster care.3
Especially for children whose parents‘ parental rights have been
terminated, the connection with their biological parent remains central to
their development and these children make efforts to maintain that
connection.4 Once it becomes clear that the purpose for terminating the
parental rights (i.e., freeing the child for adoption) will not be served, in
an increasing number of cases, the state child-placing agency, parent, or
the child has approached the court asking that the legal relationship
between the parent and child be reinstated.5
Those efforts to recognize the importance of the parent-child
relationship and the legal significance of that relationship have
manifested themselves in state legislation that allows specific individuals
enacted to ensure that children who cannot return to their family or extended
family do not remain in long-term foster care. Under ASFA, states must file a
petition to terminate parental rights and concurrently, identify, recruit, process
and approve a qualified adoptive family on behalf of any child, regardless of
age, that has been in foster care for 15 out of the most recent 22 months.
Exceptions can be made to these requirements if: (1) at the state's option, a child
is being cared for by a relative; (2) the state agency documents, in the case plan
which is available for court review, a compelling reason why filing is not in the
best interest of the child; or (3) the state agency has not provided to the child's
family, consistent with the time period in the case plan, the services deemed
necessary to return the child to a safe home. ASFA § 103.
3
See MARK COURTNEY ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, MIDWEST EVALUATION
OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE
21, 3 (2007). (―Midwest Study‖) (finding that almost all of ―aged out‖ foster
youth in their sample maintained at least some family ties). The prospective
study was designed to provide a comprehensive picture of how foster youth
made the transition to adulthood. No distinctions were made between legal
orphans and those who ―aged out‖ of the foster care system with legal parents.
Ninety-four percent of those studied reported feeling somewhat or very close to
at least one biological family member. Id. Eighty-three percent reported having
contact with one or more biological family members at least once a week. Id.
See Mary E. Collins, Ruth Paris & Rolanda L. Ward, The Permanence of
Family Ties: Implications for Youth Transitioning From Foster Care, 78(1) AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 54 (2008) (providing an overview of recent study
findings of former foster youth living with family after care); Katharine Bartlett,
Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 905
(1984).
4
Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their
Effect on Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L. Q. 233,
237 (1986).
5
See Patrick Parkinson, Child Protection, Permanency Planning and Children’s
Right to Family Life, 17 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAM. 147, 159 (2003) (noting that
being ‗freed‘ for adoption, but ‗not chosen‘ is one of the worst possible
outcomes for children because it in limbo and is likely to undermine any sense
of permanence or security for these children).
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to petition the court to reinstate parental rights.6 Before such statutes
were enacted and where no statute exists, parties have constructed legal
theories that would allow the parent and child to enjoy some of the legal
rights and responsibilities that they possessed prior to the termination.7
The success of these latter efforts has been mixed, as courts have dealt
with the tension of balancing the best interest of the child against public
policy that weighs toward the finality of termination orders.8
Though the legal responses to parents‘ attempts to resuscitate
parental rights vary, each attempts to respond to the lack of flexibility
inherent in a permanent termination final judgment or order. The courts‘
lack of explicit statutory authority to modify termination orders when
circumstances change has made individual responses necessary. Instead
of enacting legislation to require a separate legal proceeding to vacate
the order, this article recommends giving courts statutory authority and
discretion to enter temporary termination of parental rights orders. These
provisional orders would free the child for adoption for a limited time
period but would also allow parental rights to be reinstated if the court
subsequently determines that the child is no longer adoptable or that
adoption is no longer in the child‘s best interest.
Recognizing the need for more uniform solutions to the problems
created when a child loses legal rights to his or her biological parents
without those rights being replaced through adoption, this article
examines the efforts currently being made to address the increasing
number of legal orphans9 created each year. After recounting both state
and individual initiatives, this article proposes that states enact
legislation providing for a temporary termination of parental rights order
(―TTPR‖) entered after a bifurcated hearing on the parent‘s fitness and
the child‘s best interests.
Section I provides a brief overview of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act, a federal law enacted in 1997, and its possible impact on
the creation of legal orphans. Section II presents an overview of current
state efforts to provide a mechanism by which parental rights may be
reinstated. Section III explores court responses to individual requests to
recreate parent-child relationships after termination of parental rights.
6

See infra Section II.
See infra Section III.
8
Id.
9
47 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 63 (2008) (defining a ―legal orphan‖ as
a child whose parents‘ rights have been terminated, but has not yet been
adopted). The term ―legal orphan,‖ in the sense in which it is used in this article,
seems to have been originated by Professor Martin Guggenheim. See Martin
Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care – An Empirical Analysis in Two
States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995).
7
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Section IV outlines arguments related to res judicata and equal
protection that may be used by parents when the court denies standing.
Finally, section V proposes a method of temporarily terminating parental
rights which ensures that children do not exit the foster care system
without legal parents. Further, this section discusses situations when the
option may be most appropriate.
I. THE ADOPTIONS AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT MAY BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF LEGAL ORPHANS
As of September 30, 2006, there were 510,000 children in the foster
care system nationally.10 The majority of children brought to the
attention of the state protection agencies are victims of child neglect.11
When it is deemed unsafe for a child to return to his or her home, he or
she may be placed in foster care.12 Foster care placement can be with a
relative, in a group home or state facility, or with a licensed foster
family.13 While the children are in the foster care system, the state child
protection agency is legally obligated to provide services to the child‘s
family to support reunification.14 When reunification is not possible,
however, the state has a concurrent obligation to ensure the child‘s move
towards a permanent living arrangement.15 In most cases, permanency
for these children means adoption.16
10

U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
AFCARS REPORT #14 (2008), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb
/stats_research/afcars/tar/report14.htm [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT #14].
11
During FY 2007, 59.0 percent of child victims experienced neglect, 10.8
percent were physically abused, 7.6 percent were sexually abused, 4.2 percent
were psychologically maltreated, less than 1 percent were medically neglected,
and 13.1 percent were victims of multiple maltreatments. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES,
CHILD
MALTREATMENT
2007
(2007),
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm07/index.htm.
12
SUE BADEAU & SARAH GESIRIECH, A CHILD‘S JOURNEY THROUGH THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM (2003), available at http://pewfostercare.org/docs/index.php
?DocID=24.
13
Id.
14
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2009) (declaring that states reasonable efforts
shall be made to preserve and reunify families unless the parent has committed a
serious violent crime, such as murder).
15
See 42 U.S.C. § 675 (E) (2009) (requiring that the state takes steps to free
children who have been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months for
adoption, unless the child has been placed with a relative or there are other
compelling reasons not to terminate parental rights).
16
See id. (laying out the options for permanency including reunification with
parents, adoption, or legal guardianship). Of the 510,000 children in foster care
on September 30, 2006, 49% had a permanency goal of reunification and 23%
had a goal of adoption. AFCARS REPORT #14, supra note 10.
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A. THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997
The enactment of the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980 signaled a change in federal policy impacting children and
families in foster care. This legislation required states to focus on
reunification and family preservation.17 The law required states to make
―reasonable efforts‖ prior to removing a child from his or her home and
similar efforts to return the child after removal has occurred.18 Critics
questioned whether the law actually protected children and argued that it
led to keeping children in unsafe homes or reunifying them with unfit
parents.19 After years of debate, the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA)20 was passed in an effort to address three general perceptions
about the child welfare system at that time: children continued to remain
too long in foster care; the child welfare system was biased toward
family preservation at the expense of children‘s safety and well-being;
and inadequate attention and resources were devoted to adoption as a
permanent placement option for abused and neglected children.21
The purpose of the 1997 law was to assist states with achieving
permanency for children in foster care, either by reuniting them with
their families or moving them more quickly to a permanent placement
with another family.22 When a child is placed in foster care, ASFA
established strict timelines for the state to return children placed in foster
care to their parents or to initiate parental rights termination proceedings
so the child could be adopted. In order to remain eligible for federal
17

Cristina Chi-Young Chou, Renewing The Good Intentions Of Foster Care:
Enforcement Of The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act Of 1980 And
The Substantive Due Process Right to Safety, 46 VAND. L. REV. 683, 689
(1993).
18
AACWA § 101.
19
See Jill Sheldon, 50,000 Children are Waiting, Permanency, Planning and
Termination of Parental Rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 73, 83-85 (detailing two tragic
stories of children who experienced violence at the hands of their biological
parents after they were reunited with their families).
20
AFSA was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on November 19, 1997.
21
KASIA O‘NEILL MURRAY & SARAH GESIRIECH, PEW COMM‘N ON CHILDREN
IN WELFARE, A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 5
(2004), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx?id=
48994.
22
Two ways in which AFSA attempted to expedite permanent placement of
children were by eliminating the ―reasonable efforts‖ for reunification
requirement in circumstances where there were aggravating factors inhibiting
the reunion of parent and child, such as murder and by promoting concurrent
planning where attempts at reunification proceed alongside attempts to find an
adoptive family. See Patrick Parkinson, Child Protection, Permanency
Planning, and Children’s Right to Family Life, 17 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAM. 147,
154-55 (2003).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2608614

324

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 17:2

funding, each state must include these provisions in their plan for foster
care and adoption assistance.23
B. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The right of parents to raise their children is fundamental.24
However, the parens patriae authority of the state enables it to intervene
to protect children.25 When a child is removed from his or her home due
to abuse and/or neglect and cannot return, every state provides by statute
a mechanism for the involuntary termination of parental rights.26 The
termination case is initiated, ―not to punish parents who fail to meet their
obligations to the child, but to protect the child and her interests.‖27 To
do so, the state28 must file a petition setting forth the grounds for the
termination29 and a hearing must be held.30 Termination is granted only if
23

See 42 U.S.C. § 671. Federal law also states that the provisions should not
construed to preclude state courts from exercising their discretion to protect the
health and safety of children in individual cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 678.
24
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that a statute
excluding an unwed father from the definition of parent and denying him a
parental fitness hearing upon the death of the child‘s mother was a violation of
the father‘s due process rights).
25
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
26
See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.c
fm. See also Jenina Mella, Termination of Parental Rights Based on Abuse or
Neglect, 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 483 §2 (2007) (asserting that actions for the
termination of parental rights in the context of abuse, neglect, or dependency
proceedings are the centerpiece of the child welfare adjudication system).
27
C.A. v. Dep‘t of Child. and Families, 16 So.3d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
28
In most states only the state has standing to seek termination of parental
rights; however, some states grant standing to individuals, including the parent,
guardian ad litem and those seeking to adopt the child. See, e.g., DKM v. RJS,
924 P.2d 985 (Wyo. 1996) (terminating father‘s parental rights upon application
of mother); Stanley v. Fairfax County Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 405 S.E.2d 621,
622-23 (Va. 1991) (holding that guardian ad litem of children had standing to
petition for termination of residual rights of parents). But see In re Kingsley,
623 So.2d 780, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a minor child did
not have capacity to bring termination proceeding in his own right); Christina
Dugger Sommer, Empowering Children: Granting Foster Children the Right to
Initiate Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1200
(1994).
29
The grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are specific
circumstances under which the child cannot safely be returned home because of
risk of harm by the parent or the inability of the parent to provide for the child's
basic needs. Each state is responsible for establishing its own statutory grounds,
and these vary by state.
30
See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
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it is proven by at least clear and convincing evidence31 that the parent is
―unfit‖ and that terminating parental rights is in the child‘s best interest.
The factors that the court considers when deciding whether to grant
the petition vary from state to state.32 Generally, however, courts
consider the nature of the original abuse/neglect report and continued
risk; the mental status of the parent; the degree of parental compliance
with the service plans and the consistency with which the parents visit
the child.33 In most cases, parents have little chance of successfully
defending against termination,34 even when they have an attorney (which
is not constitutionally required in every case).35
Terminating parental rights does not guarantee that the child will be
adopted.36 Thus, it is impossible for the state to prove conclusively that
the termination will achieve its intended purpose. When it does not,
children are left in legal limbo and are likely to experience posttermination changes in placement.37 Further, one recent study found that

31

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
Id. (establishing procedural guidelines for termination of parental rights
proceedings; however, it provided no guidance for substantive standards). The
Court noted that ―[p]ermanent neglect proceedings employ imprecise
substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective
values of the judge.‖ Id. at 762.
33
See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, supra note 26, at 2; Eve M.
Brank et al., Parental Compliance: Its Role in Termination of Parental Rights
Cases, 80 NEBRASKA L. REV. 343-45 (2001).
34
A study of the outcome of termination of parental rights hearings in New
York City in 2008 revealed that 59.5% of proceedings resulted in a termination.
KIDS‘ WELL-BEING INDICATORS CLEARINGHOUSE, KWIC INDICATORS AND
NARRATIVE FOR FOSTER CARE – TERMINATED PARENTAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS,
http://www.nyskwic.org/u_indicators/indicator_narrative.cfm?numIndicatorID=
38 (last visited Nov. 23, 2009). In FY 2006, 79,000 children in foster had their
parental rights terminated for all living parents. AFCARS REPORT #14, supra
note 10, at 6. In FY 2005, parents of 66,000 children had their rights terminated.
U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
THE AFCARS REPORT #13 6 (2006) [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT #13]. In FY
2002, 67,000; in FY 2001, 66,000; in FY 2000, 73,000; in FY 1999, 72,000; and
in FY 1998, 60,000. U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES,
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT #12 11 (2006) [hereinafter
AFCARS REPORT #12].
35
See Lassiter v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
36
See PARKINSON supra, note 22 at 159 (expressing concern over the number of
children in the United States who have had parental rights terminated, but have
not found alternative families to provide long term care).
37
Gretta Cushing & Sarah B. Greenblatt, Vulnerability to Foster Care Drift
after the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 RES. SOC. WORK PRAC. 694, 698
32
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for each year that a child spent in foster care after termination of parental
rights, the likelihood of adoption was reduced by 80%.38
C. LEGAL ORPHANS
It is difficult to determine the number of legal orphans in the United
States. In 1999, one source estimated that there were between 40,000 and
80,000 children who had been freed for adoption but had not yet been
adopted nationwide.39 Another source approximated that there were
5,970 legal orphans created in 1997 and 24,219 in 1999.40 The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services estimates that on September
30, 2006, there were 129,000 children waiting to be adopted.41 This latter
figure includes children who have a goal of adoption and/or whose
parental rights have been terminated. It does not, however, include
children sixteen years old and older whose parental rights have been
terminated and who have a permanency goal of emancipation. Thus, this
estimate is both over- and under-inclusive.
While studies have not provided accurate numbers, they have
concluded that the absence of a legal parent has negative social,
(2009) (finding that only 30% of children who were not adopted by family that
they lived with prior to termination remained in that home).
38
Id. In that study, permanency goal changes were experienced by 29% of the
children who had not been adopted. 8% had a goal change to independent
living, 155 had a goal change to long-term foster care, 1% had a goal change to
subsidized guardianship, less than 1% had a goal change to reunification and
2% had a goal change to ―other‖ with indication that transfer to a long-term care
facility was planned. As of September 30, 2006, a median of 13.0 months
(mean: 24.9) had elapsed since termination of parental rights. AFCARS REPORT
#14, supra note 10, at 6. From FYs 1998-2005, the median was 12.8, 12.0, 13.5,
14.8, 15.7, and 15.3 months, respectively. AFCARS REPORT #12, supra note 34,
at 11; AFCARS REPORT #13, supra note 34, at 6.
39
Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care - An Empirical
Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L. Q. 121, 140 (1995) (extrapolating on data
from Michigan and New York).
40
Barbara W. Stack, Law to Increase Adoptions Results in More Orphans,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 3, 2005.
41
AFCARS REPORT #14, supra note 10. The number of children who fall within
the specified categories is counted each year on September 30th. In FY 1998
there were 125,000; FY 1999 there were 130,000; FY 2000 there were 131,000;
FY 2001 there were 129,000; FY 2002 there were 124,000. AFCARS REPORT
#12, supra note 35. In FY 2003 there were 120,000. U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN,
YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT #10. In FY
2004 there were 118,000. U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN.
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES,
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT #11. In FY 2005 there were
114,000. AFCARS REPORT #13, supra note 34.
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emotional, and financial effects.42 The loss of the legal relationship can
mean a loss of the physical and emotional relationship between the
parent and child.43 When parental rights are terminated, the biological
parents usually lack standing to request continued visitation with their
children, 44 even if no adoption is pending. Thus, legal orphans can lose
the connection to their biological parent that is important to their social
and emotional development.45 Although it is arguable that every child
whose parents‘ rights are terminated experiences a similar loss, the
effects are magnified when the connection is not replaced through
adoption.46
In addition to the social and emotional consequence of losing their
parents, laws require many legal orphans to forfeit continued financial
assistance from their biological parents.47 While states differ on the issue
42

See sources cited supra note 3.
Id.
44
See discussion infra Section (V)(b)(i) of this article.
45
There is a connection between loss due to foster care placement, termination
of parental rights and negative behaviors in children. ―Children who experience
such losses may be particularly vulnerable to angry behavior and disrespect
toward adults and are at risk of falling into a cycle of negative behavior and
weakened connections with adults.‖ MARCY VIBOCH, CHILDHOOD LOSS AND
BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS: LOOSENING THE LINKS 1, 5 (Dec. 1, 2005), available
at http://www.vera.org/content/childhood-loss-and-behavioral-problemsloosening-links (citing Francine Cournos, The Trauma of Profound Childhood
Loss: A Personal and Professional Perspective, 73 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 145
(2002)). Studies further reveal that ties to extended family are integral to the
development of cultural and personal identity as well as emotional well-being.
Rita S. Eagle, The Separation Experience of Children in Long Term Care:
Theory, Research, and Implications for Practice, 64 AMER. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 421 (Jul. 1994).
46
When a child is adopted, he or she becomes the legal child of the adoptive
parent. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 170 (2009) (―The effect of the adoption
decree is to transfer to the adoptive parent all legal rights, duties, and
consequences of the parental relationship; accordingly, the adoption decree
transfers the right to custody of the child, the right to control the child's
education, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal
consequences and incidents of the natural relation in the same manner as if the
child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock.‖).
47
See Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the Legal Orphan: Inheritance Rights of
Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125, 175 (2005)
(noting that in some states, termination of parental rights statutes expressly
provide that the right of the child to inherit from the biological parent survives
termination; other state statutes extinguish the inheritance of the child.
However, many state termination statutes make no specific reference to
inheritance rights). Robert Schoeni & Karen Ross, Family Support during the
Transition to Adulthood, 12 NETWORK ON TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD
POLICY BRIEF, (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/dow
nloads/chap%2012-formatted.pdf (estimating that parents provide their young
43
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of whether parents have a continuing obligation to support the child after
their rights have been terminated,48 in a significant number of states
termination of parental rights results in the loss of the child‘s right to
inherit from his biological parents intestate.49
Not surprisingly, children who age out of the foster care system
without permanent homes or legal connections experience dire
outcomes50 in an array of well-being indicators, including
homelessness,51 criminal involvement,52 mental and physical health,53

adult children with assistance totaling approximately $38,000 between the ages
of 18 and 34).
48
See M.D.C. v. K.D., --So.2d--, 2008 WL 3582689 (Ala. Civ. App.
2008)(providing overview of state case law deciding whether a parent‘s
obligation to pay child support ends when parental rights are terminated).
49
See BROWN, supra note 47.
50
Mark Courtney, The Difficult Transition to Adulthood for Foster Youth in the
US: Implications for the State as Corporate Parent, 23 SOCIAL POLICY REPORT
3 (2009) (providing a complete survey of research on children transitioning
from the foster care system).
51
In New York City, the Department of Homeless Services estimated that 23%
of children who age out of foster care enter homeless shelters. William
Scarborough & Michelle Titus, Notice of Public Hearing on the Needs of Youth
Aging out of Foster Care, Assembly Standing Committee on Children and
Families, Assembly Subcommittee on Foster Care, York College, 1 (Dec. 14,
2007). In another sample, 80% of homeless youth did not earn enough to be
self-supporting four years after aging out, with 50% unemployed, and 25%
experiencing homelessness. Ronna Cook, et al., Westat, Inc., A National
Evaluation of Title IV-E Foster Care Independent Living Programs for Youth,
14 (1991).
52
Mark Courtney, et al., Foster Youth Transitions to Adulthood: A Longitudinal
View of Youth Leaving Care, 80 CHILD WELFARE 685 (Nov. 2001). Twenty-five
percent of males who aged out without a permanent placement had been
incarcerated at least once in a six month period within 12-18 months after
leaving custody. MIDWEST STUDY, supra note 3, at 65-68. Twenty-four percent
of males in the sample were arrested within a year of aging out. Richard Barth,
On Their Own: The Experiences of Youth After Foster Care, 7 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 419 (Oct. 1990) (35% of California youths aging
out were arrested or convicted).
53
The Illinois Child Well-Being Study, a longitudinal analysis of 400 children,
found clinical and borderline levels of behavior and mental health diagnoses
associated with lack of exit to permanency and found the rate of posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) at 25%. The Midwest study sample of children that did
not exit to permanency found that the majority were without health insurance
and that 15% had developed a mental health or substance disorder after the first
year of aging out. MIDWEST STUDY, supra note 3, at 44-45. Over two-fifths of
former foster children who had aged out scored highly on a depression scale.
DIANA BRANFORD & CAROL ENGLISH, FOSTER YOUTH TRANSITION TO
INDEPENDENCE STUDY, (2004), at 26, available at http://www.dshs.wa.gov/pdf/
ca/FYTRpt_2.pdf.
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education level,54 and reliance on public assistance.55 These problems are
particularly acute for the legal orphans who are not adopted and who exit
the foster care system through emancipation at the age of 18 or 21.56
Without the support of a family, they are on their own to access needed
services. Because these young adults have high instances of poverty,
unemployment and homelessness;57 depriving them of child support,
inheritance and familial support is particularly problematic.
In his article The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care – An
Empirical Analysis in Two States, Professor Martin Guggenheim
suggested two proposals to change the way termination proceedings are
conducted in most states.58 The first concerned the bases upon which
termination orders are entered, and the second concerned the
reviewability of termination orders when it becomes clear that the
children freed for adoption will not be adopted.59 Professor Guggenheim
urged state legislatures to develop a mechanism by which courts could
review parental rights termination orders after one year.60 Under this

54

In a 2001 study of individuals who had aged out of care within the prior two
to four years, only about 50% of the sample had completed high school or
received a GED. KIMBERLEY NOLLAN & CHRIS DOWNS, PREPARING YOUTH FOR
LONG-TERM SUCCESS – PROCEEDINGS FROM THE CASEY FAMILY PROGRAM
NATIONAL INDEPENDENT LIVING FORUM 28 (2001). In a 1998 study, only 9% of
the study sample of who had aged out had entered college. COURTNEY, Foster
Youth Transitions, supra note 52, at 685-717. A 2005 study found that children
exiting to permanency were twice as likely to have a high school diploma or
GED as their age group peers who had not reached permanency. Midwest
Study, supra note 3, at 26-27.
55
Of the 2001 sample, under half of the approximately 600 individuals studied
maintained stable employment after aging out. NOLLAN & DOWNS, PREPARING
YOUTH FOR LONG-TERM SUCCESS, supra note 54, at 28.
56
Each year, an estimated 20,000 youth transition out of foster care in the
United States. Most states emancipate foster children at the age of eighteen;
however, a growing number of states allow children to remain in foster care
until age twenty-one. Mark E. Courtney, Youth Aging Out of Foster Care,
Policy Brief, 19 NETWORK ON TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD 1-2 (Apr. 2005),
available at http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/downloads/courtney-foster%20care.pdf.
57
See MIDWEST STUDY, supra note 3.
58
Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care – An Empirical
Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L. Q. 121, 134-35 (1995).
59
Id. In her article, entitled 50,000 Children are Waiting: Permanency,
Planning and Termination of Parental Rights under the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 73, 82 (Winter,
1997), Jill Sheldon opined that the proposal would create greater confusion and
uncertainty in the life of a child.
60
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 58, at 137.
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proposal, courts would be empowered to revoke the termination order
and restore parental rights if deemed in the child‘s best interest.61
Other solutions to address the issue that have been proposed include:
(1) establishing a higher threshold before terminating rights, whereby the
court would require that the child had been successfully placed in an
adoption home for a specified period, that the adoptive home study had
been approved, or that the adoptive placement paper had been signed; 62
(2) making the termination of parental rights (TPR) order interlocutory;63
and (3) setting aside the TPR order if the child is not adopted.64
Furthermore, while not created to address the issues related to legal
orphans, New York statute authorizes the court to suspend termination of
parental rights judgments for no more than two years when in the child‘s
best interest.65 ―The Legislature created the option of a suspended
judgment in a parental rights termination proceeding so as to allow a
brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the
child should such a second chance be in the child‘s best interest.‖66

61

Id. at 137-38.
Kirstin Andreasen, Eliminating the Legal Orphan Problem, 16 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 351, 353 (Fall 2003) (discussing the proposal without providing a
source).
63
Christopher Blake, Legal Orphans: Courts, Legislature Must Make Sure
Children Don’t Get Lost in System, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 20, 2002, at 6.
64
ANDREASEN, supra note 62, at 354.
65
NY FAM CT § 633 (2006). The maximum duration of a suspended judgment is
one year, unless the court finds at the conclusion of that period that exceptional
circumstances require an extension of that period for one additional period of up
to one year. Successive extensions may not be granted. §633(b).
Upon finding that the respondent has violated the terms and
conditions of the order of suspended judgment, the court may
enter an order revoking the order of suspended judgment and
terminating the parental rights of the respondent or, where
such extension is in the best interests of the child, extend the
period of suspended judgment for an additional period of up
to one year, if no prior extension has been granted.
§633(f). In 2007, only 7.2% of TPR proceedings in New York State resulted in
the outcome of a suspended judgment, increasing from 5.6% in 2006. NEW
YORK STATE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, NEW YORK STATE KIDS‘
WELL-BEING INDICATOR CLEARINGHOUSE, KWIC INDICATORS AND NARRATIVE
FOR FOSTER CARE TERMINATED PARENTAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS (2007),
available at http://www.nyskwic.org/access_data/ind_profile.cfm?subIndicatorI
D=85&indYear1=2007&go.x=8&go.y=4&go=Submit&indYear2=2006.
66
In re Joshua B.B., 27 A.D.3d, slip op. 867, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
62
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II. STATES HAVE BEGUN TO RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS FACED BY
LEGAL ORPHANS AND ARE BEGINNING TO PROVIDE A STATUTORY
MECHANISM BY WHICH PARENTAL RIGHTS MAY BE RESTORED
As of the writing of this article, at least ten states have enacted or are
considering legislation that would allow parental rights to be restored
when in the best interest of the child.67 These efforts evidence
recognition by states that the problems associated with legal orphans are
increasing substantially and must be addressed on a systemic level.
While these states should be commended for their efforts and other states
should follow suit,68 more needs to be done to ensure that children do not
exit the foster care system without legal parents.

67

The states are Hawaii, California, Nevada, Washington, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, Illinois, New York, Georgia and Minnesota. HAW. REV. STAT. §57163; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(2); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.160,
128.170; WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 13.34.215; LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
1051; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, §1-4-909; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28
(2010) and 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-34 (2010); S.B. 8524, 2009 S., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S.B. 292, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009); H.R.
1462, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009). In addition, Virginia law permits a
―natural parent, whose parental rights to a child have been voluntarily
relinquished . . . to seek reversal of the court order terminating his or her
parental rights.‖ The petition may only be filed if the child has not been placed
in the home of an adoptive parent. VA. CODE ANN. §16.1-241(K). See also,
Segura v. Fairfax County Dep‘t of Family Serv., No. 0858-07-4, 2008 WL
495503 at *1 (Va. App., 2008) (upholding trial court decision dismissing
mother‘s petition as untimely where child had been placed in pre-adoptive
home). Alaska law contains a similar provision, allowing:
[A] person who voluntarily relinquished parental rights to . . .
request a review hearing, upon a showing of good cause, to
vacate a termination order . . . if the person shows, by clear
and convincing evidence, that reinstatement of parental rights
is in the best interest of the child and that the person is
rehabilitated and capable of providing care and guidance that
will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare
of the child.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089 (h). The request must be made after a termination
order is entered and before the entry of an adoption or legal guardianship
decree. Id. See also, Lara S. v. State, Dep‘t. of Health & Soc. Servs., 209 P.3d
120 (Alaska 2009) (denying motion for review of termination order where
mother failed to show good cause for review of voluntary relinquishment of her
parental rights).
68
Other states, such as New Jersey, have identified an increase in the number of
legal orphans in their state child welfare system and have made
recommendations aimed at remedying the problem. See, e.g., Valerie S. Ayers,
New Jersey Department of Children and Families, No More Legal Orphans:
The State Makes a Poor Parent, available at www.nrcadoption.org/.../Action%2
0Research%20Powerpoints/V%20Ayers%20-%20New%20Jersey.ppt; see also
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A. ENACTED STATUTES
Hawaii is perhaps the first state to recognize the need for legislation
aimed at allowing the restoration of the parent-child relationship.69
―[T]he statutory framework adopted by the Hawaii legislature appears
among the most in tune with the child‘s best interest. The Hawaiian
approach to the problem at hand is sensitive to the needs of children in
the system.‖70 HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-63 provides that at any time
following the expiration of one year from the termination order, the
parent or child-placing agency may move the court to set aside the
judgment if the child has not been adopted or placed in a prospective
adoptive home.71 In reviewing the request, the court considers the
current circumstances of the child and parent and determines whether
those circumstances and the child‘s best interests justify the continuance
of the judgment.72
In 2005, the California legislature passed legislation that would
allow a child who has not been adopted after at least three years from the
date the court terminated parental rights to petition to have parental
rights reinstated if a court has determined that adoption is no longer the
permanent plan.73 Children who are no longer likely to be adopted (as
determined by the State Department of Social Services or the licensed
adoption agency responsible for custody and supervision of the child)
may file the petition before the expiration of the three-year period.74
The legislation was introduced in response to a number of court
decisions that expressed frustration with the finality of the law as it
Judge Sallyanne Floria, More Good Than Harm: Legal Orphans and the New
Jersey Post-Termination Project, 59 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 2 (Spring 2008); see
also Memorandum from Esther Wattenberg & Meghan Kelley, Legal Orphans:
Are We Creating a New Class of Children in Limbo? (Apr. 30, 1999), available
at http://cehd.umn.edu/SSW/cascw/attributes/PDF/publications/Legal_Orphans
_Memo.pdf. Furthermore, at least one class action lawsuit has been filed
identifying the number of legal orphans as an issue. On August 8, 2006,
Dwayne B. v. Granholm, No. 2:06-CV-13548 (E.D. Mich, filed Aug. 8, 2006),
was filed in the Eastern District of Michigan.
69
Hawaii established a mechanism for reviewing termination orders in 1965,
when the family court was established. Act to Establish Family Courts, HAW.
REV. STAT § 571-63 (2010).
70
Daniel A. Starett, A Plea for Permanence After Termination of Parental
Rights: Protecting the Best Interests of the Child in Ohio, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
419, 443 (2008).
71
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-63 (2009).
72
Id.
73
A.B. 519 was signed into law on October 7, 2005 and went into effect on
January 1, 2006. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(2) provides a method for
reinstating parental rights over a child who has not been adopted.
74
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(2).
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existed at the time.75 In Jerred H., the First District Court of Appeals
invited the California Legislature to consider allowing the juvenile
courts limited discretion to reinstate parental rights where the child
would otherwise be left a legal orphan.76 ―To avoid such an unhappy
consequence, legislation may be advisable authorizing judicial
intervention under very limited circumstances following the termination
of parental rights and prior to the completion of adoption.‖77 More than
fifteen parents have had their terminations reversed since the legislation
has been in effect.78
Nevada Revised Statutes 128.170, which became effective October
1, 2007, allows a Nevada court to restore parental rights if a child is not
likely to be adopted and if such restoration is in the child‘s best
interest.79 The statute allows a child or legal guardian to petition for the
rights to be reinstated but does not grant standing to the birth parents.80
The law was created in reaction to statistics that suggested that adoptions
had not kept pace with terminations.81
A similar law, Revised Code of Washington Annotated §13.34.215,
was enacted in Washington State in response to concern about the 1,400
legal orphans in that state.82 Under the Washington statute, a child who
has not achieved permanency within three years after the termination of
parental rights may petition to have his or her parents‘ rights reinstated.83
If the court conditionally reinstates parental rights, the child will be
placed in the custody of the parent.84 After six months of successful
placement, the court will conduct a hearing and enter a permanent
order.85 Even if parental rights are reinstated, the reinstatement does not
vacate the termination of parental rights order previously entered.86 The

75

There was a concern that the existing statute did not serve the best interests of
children who would never be adopted into new families.
76
In re Jerred H., 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
77
Id. at 799.
78
Kendra Hurley, When You Can’t Go Home, 15 CHILD WELFARE WATCH 18
(Winter 2008) (quoting Leslie Heimov, Executive Director of the Children‘s
Law Center of Los Angeles).
79
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.160, 128.170 (West 2008).
80
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.170 (West 2008).
81
Amanda Fehd, Nevada Law Would Let Courts Restore Parental Rights, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Apr. 4, 2007 (finding that in 2004, there were 1,153 children
waiting for adoption around the state).
82
See WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 13.34.215 (West 2008).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
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impetus for the law was a case involving parents who had rehabilitated
four years after their parental rights had been terminated.87
On recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute, the
Louisiana Children‘s Code was amended in 2008 to permit parental
rights to be reinstated upon motion by the department or a child who is
over the age of fifteen.88 The law specifies that the parent have a right to
be heard at the hearing on the motion but is not a party to the action. The
court may restore parental rights when it is in the child‘s best interest;
however, even when restoration is not appropriate, the court may allow
contact between the child and the parent or place the child in the custody
of the parent.
In 2009, Oklahoma modified its Children‘s Code to provide a
mechanism by which parental rights could be restored. Under Oklahoma
Statutes Annotated Title 10A §1-4-909, the child of at least fifteen years
of age may make an application with the court three years after a final
order of termination.89 If, after a preliminary hearing to consider the
parent‘s apparent fitness and interest in reinstatement of parental rights,
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the best interests
of the child may be served by the reinstatement, the court will conduct a
hearing on the merits. At that hearing, the parent-child relationship will
be reestablished if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the child has not and is not likely to imminently achieve permanency and
that reinstatement of parental rights is in the child‘s best interest.
Also in 2009, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-2890 was amended and
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-3491 was enacted in response to a report to
the majority leader of the Illinois House of Representatives which
identified the lack of standards for reinstating custody or restoring
parental rights to rehabilitated birth parents as a systemic barrier to
achieving permanency and stability for children in the care of elderly
caregivers.92 The former statute provides that when parental rights have
been terminated for a minimum of three years and the child who is the
87

Maureen O‘Hagan, Kids Try to Reunite with Parents, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2007 (documenting Elaine Wolcott-Ehrhardt‘s efforts to enact
legislation in Washington).
88
See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1051 (2008).
89
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, §1-4-909 (West 2009).
90
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28 (2010).
91
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-34 (2010). This statute will only be in effect for
four years after the effective date.
92
See CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL & FAMILY MATTERS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE WORK, DCFS FAMILY MATTERS PILOT PROGRAM: PERMANENCY
AND STABILITY FOR CHILDREN IN CARE OF ELDERLY/FRAIL ADOPTIVE PARENTS
AND SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANS 7 (2007), available at http://www.ilga.gov/reports
/special/Final%20Family%20Matters.pdf.
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subject of the permanency hearing is thirteen years old or older and is
not currently in a placement likely to achieve permanency, the state
child-placing agency shall make reasonable efforts to locate the parents
whose rights have been terminated.93 Once the parent is located, the
agency will assess the appropriateness of the parent and, as appropriate,
foster and support connections between the parent and child. To further
reunification efforts, the agency may file a motion to reinstate parental
rights,94 which is granted if supported by clear and convincing
evidence.95
B. PROPOSED STATUTES
New York Senate Bill 852496 was introduced in response to a
committee report that recommended that ―a provision be added to the
termination of parental rights statutes to authorize the Family Court, in
narrowly defined circumstances, to vacate orders committing
guardianship and custody of children and reinstate their birth parents‘
parental rights.‖97 Furthermore, an Administration for Children‘s
Services memorandum outlining the guidelines for adolescent cases
recognized that, in certain special cases:
The best permanency resources for a young person who
has been freed for adoption may be a member of the
child‘s birth family, including a parent from whom the
child has been freed. Sometimes, a parent‘s situation has
changed significantly since the time of the termination
proceeding and a bond between the youth and his birth
family continues.98
Prior to the bill, cases had been reported where children found
permanence with their birth parents after a judge vacated the termination
of parental rights order.99 Once enacted, the New York statute would
93

705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28 (2010) (efforts to locate the parent need not
be made when such efforts would be futile or inconsistent with the child‘s best
interests).
94
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-34 (2010).
95
Id.
96
See S.B. 8524, 2009 S., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
97
REPORT OF THE FAMILY COURT ADVISORY AND RULES COMMITTEE TO THE
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 31
(2007), available at http://nysl.nysed.gov/Archimages/88205.pdf.
98
Memorandum from William C. Bell, Commissioner, The City of New York
Administration for Children‘s Services to Executive Directors, Contract Foster
Care Agencies ACS Staff (June 12, 2003).
99
See Diane Riggs, Permanence Can Mean Going Home, ADOPTALK (Spring
2006) (outlining process used in several New York cases to vacate the order
terminating parental rights). See also HURLEY, supra note 78, at 17, 20
(showing uncertainty in the number of reversed parental rights in New York
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allow a petition to vacate a commitment of guardianship and custody
when parental rights have been terminated for more than two years prior
to the date of filing.100 The child, his or her law guardian, and the social
services district or agency to which the child was committed have
standing to file.101 As in other state proposals, the parents lack standing
to bring these actions.102
Recently, Georgia State Senator Bill Hamrick (R-Carrollton), Vice
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced Senate Bill 292
designed to revise and modernize the state's Juvenile Code.103 The bill
allows for reinstatement of parental rights in certain circumstances.
Section 15-11-323 empowers the child to file a petition if he remains in
foster care for at least three years after the termination of parental rights
and it has been determined that adoption is no longer the permanent
plan.104 The child may petition prior to the expiration of the three-year
period if the child-placing agency and child stipulate that the child is no
longer likely to be adopted.105 The court shall grant the petition if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the child is not likely to be
adopted and that the child‘s best interests will be served by the
reinstatement of parental rights.106

City since AFSA. One child advocate approximates the total number to be in the
hundreds while others estimate the number to be less than ten) and Barbara
White Stack, Teen in Flight in the Public Care System but on the Lam, 14-yearold Longs for Someone Who Cares, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 2004
(showing that similar reverse terminations have been performed in
Pennsylvania, where no restoration statute exists. ―A radical solution has been
pursued for a few . . . teens by the Child Advocacy Unit of the Defender‘s
Association of Philadelphia . . . It has persuaded judges to reverse termination in
two cases and send the teens back to parents.‖).
100
S.B. 4543, 2007 S., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
See Press Release, JUSTGeorgia, Senator Hamrick to introduce Child
Protection & Public Safety Act (Apr. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.justgeorgia.org/SB_292_Introduction.html. The Senator explained:
This is an important, complex piece of legislation designed to
improve the manner in which our courts interact with children
. . . For more than a year now, the JUSTGeorgia coalition has
done the hard work of carefully analyzing Georgia's existing
Juvenile Code and developing thoughtful improvements. They
have pulled together a wealth of valuable input from juvenile
court judges, social workers, lawyers who work in the
juvenile justice system, and, not least, affected children and
their families.
104
S.B. 292, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009).
105
Id.
106
Id.
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In 2009, Minnesota became the most recent state to initiate
legislation allowing parental rights to be reinstated when the child is ten
years of age or older; the child has not been adopted; the child consents
to the reinstatement; the parent has rectified the situation that lead to the
termination; the parent and child have reestablished a relationship; the
parent has voluntarily terminated his/her rights; and five years have
passed since the TPR order was entered, unless the motion is filed by a
child age sixteen or older, or by the local social services agency.107
Under the language of the bill, the court will use the same ―hearing
procedures, legal standard, burden of proof and rules that apply to the
modification of a long-term foster care order‖ to determine whether
reinstatement is in the child‘s best interest.108
In states without statutes granting courts the authority to review and
vacate termination orders where appropriate, individuals have filed
pleadings with the court to achieve the same or similar outcomes. In
several states, birth parents have petitioned the court to adopt or obtain
custody or legal guardianship of their biological children. Other birth
parents have moved to be declared the child‘s presumed parent or
brought a writ of habeas corpus. In efforts more akin to the process
envisioned by the newly-enacted legislation, birth parents have filed
motions under statutes that allow orders to be vacated or modified when
there have been changes in circumstances or where new evidence has
been discovered. Where no legal framework exists to support such
arguments, attempts have been made to invoke the court‘s parens patriae
authority.
III. BEFORE RECENT STATUTES AND IN STATES WHERE NO STATUTES TO
VACATE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ORDERS EXIST, THERE
HAVE BEEN A VARIETY OF INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS TO RESTORE THE
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
A. ADOPTION BY BIOLOGICAL PARENT
Adoption is the statutory process by which a child‘s legal rights and
duties toward his or her birth parent(s) are substituted by identical rights
and duties toward adoptive parent(s).109 In the United States adoption is
governed by state law,110 although state law must comply with

107

H.R. 1462, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009).
Id.
109
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (9th ed. 2009).
110
See State Adoption Laws, available at http://laws.adoption.com/statutes/state
-adoption-laws.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (cataloguing each state‘s
adoption laws).
108
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overarching federal legislation. In most states, any single adult or a
husband and wife jointly can be eligible to adopt.111
In an effort to restore their legal relationship with their biological
child, some birth parents have sought to adopt their children.112 Most
petitions are filed under laws that neither specifically grant nor deny
standing to birth parents whose rights have been terminated.113 Thus,
individual state courts have decided whether to allow parents to establish
new rights by independent adoption proceedings.
In some cases, courts have held that a parent whose rights have been
terminated may not relitigate that issue through a petition for adoption or
through any other legal proceeding.114 In others, however, courts have
111

Child Welfare Information Gateway, Who May Adopt, Be Adopted, or Place
a Child for Adoption? (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/sy
stemwide/laws_policies/statutes/parties.cfm.
112
In some cases, birth parents have been encouraged to file an adoption
petition after other efforts have been unsuccessful. For example, in In re Cody
B., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 652, 658 n.8 (Cal. 2007), the lower court stated ―in the past
I have had mother‘s parental rights terminated and who readopted their kids.‖
Id. at 658 n.8. In In the Matter of M.O., No. M2007-003470COA-R3-PT, 2007
WL 2827373, 2 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), the court noted that an adoption
proceeding ―would be the most likely available means by which to seek a legal
parent/child relationship where none exists, including after a termination order.‖
In Thompson v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 353 So. 2d
197, 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the court stated that the children‘s birth
mother ―may petition the Circuit Court, as anyone else, for the right to adopt the
children, and appropriate means are available for a complete review of her
petition‖.
113
While not the subject of this article, the Illinois law creates a specific process
for a birth parent to adopt his or her biological child if that child had been
previously adopted by a relative. This law is targeted to address situations where
the children have been adopted by relatives, such as grandparents, because the
birth parents were unable to fulfill their parental responsibilities. Later, the birth
parent has rehabilitated and is able to parent, while the adoptive parent is no
longer able to parent due to death or incapacity. In some instances, the children
may be legal orphans and already living with their birth parents. These
adoptions would undergo scrutiny by the Department of Children and Family
Services and be approved by the court only if the adoptions are in the children‘s
best interests. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/14.5.
114
In In re the Dependency of G.C.B, 870 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994),
married couple Megan and Wade Lucas sought to adopt Mrs. Lucas‘ biological
child nearly a year after she voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. The
court rejected the Lucas‘ argument that Mrs. Lucas possessed the same rights as
any other person to petition to adopt the child and held that ―a parent whose
rights have been terminated may not relitigate that issue through a petition for
adoption, or through any other legal proceeding.‖ Id. at 1043. In In the Interest
of R.N.R.R., 2007 WL 2505629 (2007), the Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed
the trial court‘s dismissal of a biological father‘s adoption petition.
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looked favorably on a biological parent‘s adoption petition, especially
when parental rights had been voluntarily terminated115 or when the
child had not been placed for adoption.116
When permitted to file adoption petitions after termination of their
parental rights, birth parents undergo background checks and go through
the same home study and court approval process as other adoptive
parents.117 They are not, however, eligible to receive an adoption subsidy
to financially assist them with the care of the child.118 Where biological
parents have not been granted standing to adopt after a termination order
or where state law explicitly prohibits it,119 some biological parents have
filed to become the legal custodian or legal guardian to their birth
children.
B. CUSTODY PETITION FILED BY BIOLOGICAL PARENT
Child custody is a court's determination of who should have physical
and/or legal control and responsibility for a minor child. Many states
have ―third party‖ custody statutes that grant non-parents standing to
initiate custody proceedings. However, few states have statutes that
specifically grant or deny biological parents standing in such cases. One
notable exception is a Virginia statute that specifically states that a
115

In In the Matter of Theresa O. v. Arthur P., 809 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
2006), a biological mother who surrendered her parental rights filed a petition to
adopt after the child had been adopted by his foster parents. While no party to
the proceeding raised the issue, the court found that a line of cases holding that
res judicata prevented standing to file petitions after termination of parental
rights did not apply in this case. Id. at 442. Based on public policy and the
specific facts of the case, the court held that standing existed where no finding
of permanent neglect had been made against the birth parent. Id. at 442-43.
116
In Partington v. Ill. Dep‘t of Children and Family Servs., 414 N.E.2d 540
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980), a biological mother petitioned to adopt one year after her
parental rights had been terminated. The child welfare agency moved to dismiss
the petition on the grounds that the petitioner was under a legal disability by
virtue of the termination of her parental rights. Id. at 541. The agency further
argued that allowing the petition would circumvent the statute which makes
surrender of children for adoption irrevocable except for fraud or duress. Id. The
Appellate Court of Illinois disagreed with the agency‘s position, stating, ―we
fail to see how the need for stability in adoption proceedings is thwarted by
permitting the parent to petition before the child is placed for adoption.‖ Id. at
542.
117
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/14.5.
118
ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Adoption Assistance Program,
Eligibility, Biological parents, in CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL, available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/index.htm (follow "Child Welfare
Policy Manual" hyperlink; then follow "Title IV-E hyperlink; then follow
"8.2B.1 Biological parents" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
119
See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.001(a) (Vernon 2003).
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person whose parental rights have been terminated by court order lacks
standing to seek custody.120
Even where the statute does not explicitly deny standing, however,
some state courts have dismissed custody petitions filed by birth parents
whose parental rights have been terminated. Recently, in In re McBride,
850 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2006), a biological mother brought a claim for
custody under an Ohio statute that permitted ―any person‖ to apply to the
juvenile court for custody of a child. The lower courts concluded that
there was no legal bar to pursuing the petition; however, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that a statutory bar did exist.121 Similar decisions
have been reached in New York, which also has a custody statute that
does not restrict the category of individuals who may apply to the court
for custody of a child. In In the Matter of John Santosky, 557 N.Y.S.2d
473 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), the court held that biological parents whose
parental rights had been permanently terminated due to neglect lacked
standing to seek custody. The court reached the same decision in In the
Matter of Tiffany H., 656 N.Y.S.2d 792 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996), and In the
Matter of T.C., 759 N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2003), where TPR‘ed
mothers were denied standing to bring a custody proceeding.
Other courts have issued rulings in favor of birth parents in their
effort to establish a legally-recognized connection with their biological
children.122 Some judges have even done so despite long lines of cases
denying standing in their jurisdiction. In late 2007, a Kings County New
York referee awarded guardianship to a biological mother nearly ten
years after the child had been freed for adoption. In that case, In re
Rasheed A., the court held that a biological parent could obtain such
relief upon showing that the circumstances precipitating the child‘s
placement in foster care had been resolved.123 Further, the movant had
120

VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A) (West 2009).
McBride, 850 N.E.2d at 43, 47.
122
In In the Interest of Konczak, 371 N.E.2d 136, (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), the court
held that a birth mother had standing to seek custody under a statute that
permitted any ―person interested in the minor‖ to apply to the court for a change
in custody. In In re the Custody of R.R.B., 31 P.3d 1212 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001),
a biological father petitioned for custody of a child nine years after her rights
were terminated. The court upheld the lower court‘s decision to grant the
petition by concluding that the adoption laws did not bar the petition. The court
stated that ―nothing in the adoption statutes precludes him from participating in
a separate, unrelated proceeding. And the cases involving dependency and
involuntary termination of parental rights are distinguishable.‖ Id. at 1216.
Addressing the argument that allowing such petitions is against the public
policy of enhancing finality in adoption proceedings, the court stated that the
biological father‘s ―nonparent petition for custody does not threaten the
integrity of the adoption process.‖ Id.
123
See In re Rasheed A., 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5853, at *1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
July 6, 2007).
121
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established by substantial evidence that the child would suffer serious
harm if the parent was not awarded custody.
A legal custody order grants the caretaker the right to consent to
medical care, enroll the child in school, and make other decisions on
behalf of a minor child.124 However, third party custodians are not
financially responsible for the children in their care and these legal
arrangements end when the child reaches the age of majority.125 Thus,
the child remains a legal orphan and is left without any legally
recognized relationship in adulthood.
C. BIOLOGICAL PARENT AS PRESUMED PARENT
Presumed parentage is most commonly associated with determining
the paternity of a child since maternity is more easily ascertained.126
―Though most of the decisional law has focused on the definition of the
presumed father, the legal principles concerning the presumed father
apply equally to a woman seeking presumed mother status.‖127
Moreover, though most of the decisional law has focused on children
born out of wedlock or in same-sex relationships, biological parents have
used the doctrine in an effort to reestablish a parent-child relationship
after parental rights have been terminated.
In In re Cody B., six years after the termination order was entered,
the birth mother requested to be designated the ―presumed mother.‖128
The birth mother argued that her actions subsequent to the termination
(e.g., allowing the child to live with her and holding him out to be her
biological son) satisfied the provisions of California law.129 The juvenile
court denied the motion as an improper collateral attack on the earlier
124

See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5302 (2009) (defining legal custody as ―[t]he
legal right to make major decisions affecting the best interest of a minor child,
including, but not limited to, medical, religious and educational decisions.‖).
125
The court retains jurisdiction over child custody issues until the child reaches
the age of emancipation, usually 18 or 21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-117(a)
(2009).
126
See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117 (1989) (noting that
a presumed father is the individual that the law presumes, until shown
otherwise, to be the legal father of a child). This may not be the actual
biological father of the child. See id. at 113-17. The law in most states creates a
―rebuttable presumption‖ that if a woman conceives or gives birth to a child
while she is married, her husband will be "presumed" to be the father of the
child. Id at 124. A similar ―presumption‖ can also be created if a father
voluntarily allows his name to be placed on a child's birth certificate. Id. These
legal presumptions will remain effective until they are successfully ―rebutted,‖
or challenged by someone in a formal legal proceeding. Id.
127
In re Salvador M., 111 Cal. App. 4th 1353, 1357 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
128
In re Cody B., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1007-08 (Cal Ct. App. 2007).
129
Id. at 1010.
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judgment of termination citing California §366.26.130 The California
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, upheld the
decision.131
D. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A writ of habeas corpus is a legal action through which a person can
seek relief from unlawful detention of themselves or another person.132
―[I]n order to prevail on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a child
custody case, the petitioner must establish that (1) the child is being
unlawfully detained, and (2) the petitioner has the superior legal right to
custody of the child.‖133 Additionally, there must be no adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Since termination orders may be appealed,
most cases seeking a writ of habeas corpus as a means of returning the
child to his or her biological parent‘s care are denied.134 Thus, it is clear
that parents seeking habeas corpus relief to challenge state procedures
which involuntarily terminate their parental rights are unlikely to be
successful.

130

See id.
Id. at 1012-13.
132
39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Remedies § 1 (2008)
(―The writ of habeas corpus traditionally has been accepted as the specific
instrument to obtain release from unlawful confinement, or to deliver someone
from unlawful custody.‖).
133
Pegan v. Crawmer, 666 N.E.2d 1091, 1095 (Ohio 1996).
134
For example, in the case of In re Lucy M., 132 Misc. 2d 251(N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1986), the natural mother brought a writ of habeas corpus seeking a return of the
child ten months after parental rights had been terminated. Id. at 251-52. Since
no appeal was taken from the original order, there was no challenge to the
court‘s jurisdiction, and other remedies were available, the court held that
habeas corpus proceeding could not be used to dispute the termination. See id. at
252-53. Similarly, in Holloway v. Clermont County Dep‘t of Human Servs.,
684 N.E.2d 1217 (Ohio 1997), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the birth
mother was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus when there was an adequate
remedy at law. Id. at 1219. Likewise, in In re Miller, 465 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio
1984), the natural mother‘s request for a writ was denied because her
―nonconstitutional‖ claims could have been raised on appeal from the
termination order. Id. at 399.
131
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E. MODIFYING OR VACATING TERMINATION ORDER
Many states permit orders issued in child welfare proceedings to be
modified or vacated when new evidence is discovered135 or when there
has been a change in circumstances that affects the child‘s best
interests.136 Birth parents, when granted standing,137 generally must
prove that the evidence is material to the issues; is more than cumulative
or impeaching; will most likely change the result at trial; and could not
have been discovered prior to trial through the use of due diligence.138
Further, facts which occur subsequent to trial are usually not considered
newly discovered evidence.139
As a result, parents seeking to modify or vacate orders terminating
their parental rights have had difficulty meeting their burden and
persuading the court that such action is legally justified.140 Some courts,
135

See, e.g., D.C. SCR-Dom. Rel. Rule 60(b)(2).
Notably, North Dakota law explicitly states that general modification
principles do not apply to orders terminating parental rights. N.D. CENT. CODE §
27-20-37 (2009). An order terminating parental rights may be vacated by the
court upon motion of the parent if the child is not in an adoptive placement and
the person having custody of the child consents in writing to the vacation of the
decree. Id.
137
See In re Cesar L., 221 W.Va. 249, 654 S.E.2d 373 (2007) (holding that birth
mother whose parental rights had been terminated lacked standing to request a
modification of termination order where there was no fraud or distress).
138
47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 692 (2008).
139
But see In re T.W.W., 449 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989)
(remanding the case where the trial court did not reopen the record to allow
newly discovered evidence). There, the birth mother filed a motion for a new
trial after her parental rights had been terminated. Id. at 104. The appellate court
determined that evidence of her parenting ability, her marriage and a recent
medical diagnosis should have been considered by the court post-termination.
Id. at 104-05.
140
In In re Anthony S., 178 Misc. 2d 1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998), the Family Court,
Kings County held that the foster parent‘s opposition to adopting the child and
his pattern of running away to his birth father was not newly discovered
evidence. Id. at 7-8. In In re Frederick S., 678 N.Y.S.2d 448 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1998), the same court decided that newly discovered evidence did not include a
child changing his mind about adoption. Id. at 451. In Utah ex rel. C.L., 166
P.3d 608 (2007), the Supreme Court of Utah, ruled that the failure of a planned
adoption did not constitute newly discovered evidence. Id. at 614. In In re Jane
Doe, I, 182 P.3d 707 (Idaho 2008), the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the
revocation of the foster placement family‘s licenses did not materially change
the finding that it was in the child‘s best interest to terminate parental rights. Id.
at 709. In In re M.F., 644 A.2d 1363 (D.C. 1994), the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that the rule allowing for a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence did not apply to neglect proceedings. Id. at 1365.
However, if the rule did apply, the parent must show the existence of an
extraordinary situation to override the public interest in finality and stability for
136
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however, have vacated prior termination orders and ordered new
dispositional hearing when changed circumstances impacted the prior
best interest determination.141
F. PARENS PATRIAE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT
Parens patriae is Latin for ―parent of the country‖ and refers to the
public policy power of the state to interfere with the rights of parents and
to act as the parent of any child who is in need of protection.142 In 1890,
the Supreme Court held that the doctrine was ―inherent in the supreme
power of every state, … a most beneficent function, and often necessary
to be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of
injury to those who cannot protect themselves.‖143
Where no statute that provides authority to challenge the termination
order exists, parents have asked the court to rely on its parens patriae
authority. In In the Matter of Female S., a biological mother filed a
motion to vacate an order terminating her parental rights four years after
it was entered.144 The Family Court in New York County held that the
court, pursuant to parens patriae, had a duty to ensure that the best
interests of the children are safeguarded.145 Thus, a hearing was required
to determine whether the order should be vacated. However, more
recently in In the Matter of Frederick S., a Family Court in New York
refused to apply the doctrine.146 Thus, as a practical matter, the reach of
the parens patriae doctrine may be affected by the reluctance of judges
to use its authority.

the children. See id. at 1365-66. The children‘s diminished prospects for
adoption were not sufficient. See id. at 1366.
141
See, e.g., In re Darrell V., 284 A.D.2d 247, 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
(holding that the foster parent‘s decision not to adopt within a year after the
termination justified a reevaluation of the best interests of the children); In re
Alasha E., 8 A.D.3d 375, 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (noting that the biological
mother‘s progress towards overcoming barriers to reunification provided
adequate support for the court‘s progress towards overcoming barriers to
reunification provided adequate support for the court‘s reconsideration); In re
Tony H., 28 A.D.3d 379, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding that the court‘s
decision was based on the inaction of the foster parent and the positive steps
that the birth parent had made); In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 169 (D.C. 1990)
(vacating the termination order and remanding the case when adoption was no
longer a realistic possibility).
142
Black's Law Dictionary 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
143
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
144
In the Matter of Female S., 444 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
145
Id. at 832.
146
In the Matter of Frederick S., 678 N.Y.S.2d 448 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998).
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IV. IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE COURTS DENY STANDING, PARENTS
MAY HAVE ARGUMENTS RELATED TO RES JUDICATA AND EQUAL
PROTECTION
A. APPLICABILITY OF RES JUDICATA
When faced with legal efforts to reestablish the parent-child
relationship once severed by a termination order, whether by the filing of
a petition to regain custody, a motion seeking a vacation or modification
of the termination order, or by other means, many court decisions have
relied on the doctrine of res judicata, which includes claim preclusion
and collateral estoppel,147 to dismiss the case and deny relief.148 The
majority of these cases, however, fail to discuss whether the doctrine
applies to such proceedings.149 While few courts have expressly held that
the doctrine does not apply in child custody and termination of parental
rights cases, including those filed post-termination of parental rights,150
far more have failed to rule on the issue.151
When applied to termination of parental rights cases, this doctrine
has served to prevent biological parents from revisiting the issue of
parental fitness by filing requests for adoption or custody. However, the
doctrine is rarely, if ever, successfully used to prohibit the state from
filing second petitions to terminate parental rights when the first was

147

Res judicata has two distinct but related branches: (1) claim preclusion,
which bars the re-litigation of claims that have been previously litigated
between the same parties, and (2) issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, which
prevents re-litigation of issues that have been decided, though the causes of
action or claims for relief are not the same.
148
See, e.g., Matter of Lucy M., 503 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986);
Santosky v. Roach, 557 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. 1990); Matter of Custody of
Tiffany H., 656 N.Y.S.2d 792 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996); and T.C. v. R.C., 759
N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2003).
149
Some states have enacted laws that explicitly apply these doctrines to
termination orders. For example, the Tennessee statute prohibits a termination
of parental rights to be overturned by any court or collaterally attacked by any
person or entity after one year from the date of entry of the final order of
termination. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(q) (2009).
150
See, e.g., In the Matter of Theresa O., 809 N.Y.S.2d (holding that res judicata
did not prevent biological mother to seek adoption).
151
See, e.g., In the Interest of T.J., A.H. and K.H., 945 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (―[W]e need not reach the issue of whether different notions of res
judicata should be applied in termination of parental rights proceedings.‖) and
In the Interest of J.J.T. and T.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(―Thus we save for another day the difficult question of whether, and to what
extent, res judicata really applies in the context of termination of parental
rights.‖).
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unsuccessful.152 Thus, the doctrine–as commonly applied–provides little
protection to parents, either before or after their parental rights have been
terminated.
Due to the unique nature of parental rights termination proceedings,
movants can argue that traditional res judicata analysis should not apply.
As the issue of whether rights should be terminated must be decided
upon the basis of the conditions at the time of trial, parents should not be
foreclosed from initiating proceedings to reestablish a legal relationship
with children in a subsequent proceeding. A court‘s conclusion that that
termination was warranted at the time of the initial proceeding is not a
judicial termination that the parent will forever be ―unfit‖ and that their
subsequent actions could not deem them ―fit.‖
In Green v. State Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., the District
Court of Appeals of Florida noted that collateral estoppel does not apply
when a birth parent files to adopt her child after parental rights have
been terminated.153 ―[W]hen the circumstances supporting the order of
commitment are no longer present at the time an adoption petition is
filed, estoppel by judgment may not be invoked to prevent litigation of
the adoption issues.‖154 Similarly, in Stefanos v. Rivera-Berrios, the
District Court of Appeals held that collateral estoppel was not available
because the termination proceeding had not determined the birth father‘s
present fitness to adopt.155
B. DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Another argument available to movants seeking to restore the parentchild relationship is that denying standing to terminated parents violates
their right to equal protection under the law.156 In In the Interest of
Hughes, the birth mother argued that a Texas statute that prohibited ―a
former parent whose parent-child relationship with the child has been
terminated by court decree‖ from filing a petition to adopt violated equal
152

In Slatton v. Brazoria County Protective Servs. Unit, 804 S.W.2d 550, 553
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991), for example, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the
state could file a petition to terminate parental rights less than one year after the
court had dismissed a prior petition. ―The prior denial of termination was not a
complete bar to the subsequent action, but it was a bar to the admission of the
[parent‘s] conduct which occurred prior to that order being used against them.‖
153
Green v. State Dep‘t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 412 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
154
Id. at 415.
155
Stefanos v. Rivera-Berrios, 673 So.2d 12 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The
decision of the district court was reversed on appeal on other grounds.
156
The 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that the
government must treat a person or class of persons the same as it treats other
persons or classes in like circumstances. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
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protection under both the state and federal constitutions.157 Since
biological parents whose parental rights have been terminated are not a
suspect class, the court applied the ―rational basis test‖ to determine the
legality of the statute.158 The court found that legitimate state interests
relating to the child and the public policy favoring the finality of
judgments are both served by the statute.159
In In re McBride, the biological mother similarly argued that not
allowing her to seek custody under a statute that permits ―any person‖ to
file a custody petition violated state and federal equal protection.160
While not directly addressing this argument, the court justified the
disparate treatment by referring to statutory language that denies
biological parents standing to modify termination orders.161 Had the
equal protection claim been addressed, the court may have come to the
same conclusion as the Hughes court, unless a higher level of scrutiny
was invoked.
By arguing that such statutes and the court‘s interpretation of those
statutes have a disparate impact on women and minorities, movants can
persuade the court to employ intermediate and strict scrutiny analyses,
respectively.162 Research supports the contention that women and people
157

In the Interest of Hughes, 770 S.W.2d 635 (1989).
Id. at 637. See also, Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966) (―Equal
protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does
require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the
classification is made.‖). In today's constitutional jurisprudence, equal
protection means that legislation that discriminates must have a rational basis
for doing so. If the legislation affects a fundamental right (such as the right to
vote) or involves a suspect classification (such as race), it is unconstitutional
unless it can withstand strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the state must
establish that it has a compelling interest that justifies and necessitates the law
in question.
159
In the Interest of Hughes, 770 S.W.2d at 637.
160
In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d.
158

161

We find unpersuasive the arguments that [the mother] should
not be placed in a worse position than a legal stranger and that
in denying her standing we create a separate class of those
who cannot file for custody. [The mother] is already in a
limited class of two as one of [the child‘s] biological parents
whose own actions caused her parental rights to be
terminated.
Id. at 47.
162
Challenged laws that negatively affect women at a disproportionate rate are
tested under intermediate scrutiny because gender is a quasi-suspect class.
Under the standard, the disparate treatment must be substantially related to the
achievement of an important governmental objective. Further, the court uses a
strict scrutiny analysis when reviewing laws having a disparate impact on a
suspect class, such as race. See discussion supra note 158.
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of color are more likely than their male and white counterparts to be in
the position to seek restoration of their parental rights. One study
revealed that a mother‘s substance abuse led to the termination of
parental rights in over half of the cases examined.163 Further, because
birth mothers maintain closer, ongoing relationships with their children
while they are in foster care and after they age out, mothers are more
likely than fathers to seek restoration of their parental rights.164
Similarly, minorities are disparately affected by laws denying former
parents standing to restore parental rights or challenge termination
orders. While African American and Hispanic parents have a
significantly lower risk of having their parental rights terminated,165
minority children are also less likely to be adopted.166 As a consequence,
minority parents are more likely to be in the position to petition the court
to have their parental rights reinstated.
While these arguments may be available to TPR‘ed parents, their
necessity arises from the fact that new proceedings must be initiated in
order to restore the parent-child relationship. The following section
describes a process by which restoration can be accomplished without
raising standing issues associated with requiring biological parents or
children to initiate proceedings after rights have been permanently and
―irrevocably‖ terminated.

163

Esther Wattenberg, Meghan Kelley, & Hyungmo Kim, When the
Rehabilitation Ideal Fails: A Study of Parental Rights Termination, 80 CHILD
WELFARE 405, 414 (2001).
164
One longitudinal study found that of children age 19, who had aged out of
the foster care system, 67.2% felt ―very close‖ or ―somewhat close‖ to their
biological mother. Of the same cohort, only 38% reported feeling same level of
closeness to their biological father. When studied 3 years later at age 21, 55% of
former foster youth had a ―very close‖ or ―somewhat close‖ relationship with
their biological mother and 30.6% with their biological father. Moreover, 27.5%
reported having daily contact with their biological mother; 9.2% with their
biological father. MARK E. COURTNEY & AMY DWORSKY, MIDWEST
EVALUATION OF ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES
AT AGE 19 14 (May 2005) and MARK E. COURTNEY, ET. AL., MIDWEST
EVALUATION OF ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES
AT AGE 21 17-18 (Dec. 2007). This is also supported by the author‘s informal
survey of case law which found the birth mother to be the moving party in the
overwhelming majority of the cases reviewed.
165
Kelly Noonan & Kathleen Burke, Termination of Parental Rights: Which
Foster Care Children are Affected, 42 SOC. SCI. J. 241, 253 (2005).
166
Of the 129,000 children waiting to be adopted, nearly sixty percent are
minority. AFCARS REPORT #14, supra note 10. See also, note 210.
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V. A TEMPORARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ORDER WOULD
PROVIDE THE COURT WITH AN OPTION THAT ENSURES THAT ALL
CHILDREN CAN EXIT THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM WITH LEGAL PARENTS
The recent enactment of state laws that allow parental rights to be
reinstated, as well as the number of cases that have been filed to
reestablish the parent-child relationship, clearly highlight the need to
reconsider the legal permanency of termination of parental rights orders.
The traditional notion that termination orders must be final to promote
stability is challenged by the increasing number of children who are
being permanently harmed by laws that purport to serve their best
interests. Current laws governing termination of parental rights do not
appreciate the growing problem of legal orphans nor do they allow
judges to serve the best interests of children. Therefore, they must be
reformed and a broader menu of permanency options must be made
available to respond to the needs of children.
While permanently severing the relationship may be the proper
decision in many circumstances, state legislatures must provide courts
with another option when ruling on termination petitions. One option
that should be available to judges is the authority to temporarily
terminate parental rights when it is in the child‘s best interest. This
proposal encompasses many of the positive aspects of solutions offered
previously.167
A. THE PROCESS 168
Consistent with the current procedure, the government attorney
would file a petition to terminate parental rights. That petition would be
fully litigated and the court would then issue a ruling on the issue of
whether the government had met its burden. Thus, a temporary
termination of parental rights order could only be entered after the
government has met the burden necessary to constitute a permanent
termination of parental rights order. The government would have no
standing to move the court to order a temporary termination of parental
rights. This requirement is necessary to prevent misuse and abuse by the
government attorneys who may attempt to persuade the court that a
temporary termination order does not require the same level of
evidentiary proof as a permanent order. Such action would undermine
the purpose of the proposal and serve to harm children and families by
potentially making it easier to terminate parental rights.
If the government meets its burden, the court would not issue an
order terminating parental rights. Instead, a ―TPR finding‖ would be
issued and the parent would be given the opportunity to appeal the
167
168

See sources cited supra notes 60-64.
Appendix A presents a series of flow charts illustrating the process.
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ruling169 or request a temporary termination of parental rights hearing.170
If an appeal is filed, the TPR proceeding will be stayed until it is
resolved. If the parent prevails, then the TPR finding would be vacated;
if the parent does not prevail, the court would remand the case to give
the parent the opportunity to request a temporary termination of parental
rights hearing. If no temporary termination of parental rights hearing is
requested, a permanent TPR order would be entered. If, however, the
parent does request that a temporary termination of parental rights be
ordered, the court would conduct a temporary termination of parental
rights hearing at which the parent would have the burden of proving by
preponderance of the evidence that temporarily, rather than permanently,
terminating parental rights would be in the child‘s best interest.171
When determining whether to grant a parent‘s request for a
temporary termination of parental rights order, the court should consider
evidence related to the relationship between the child and the parent; the
child‘s attitude regarding the termination; the child‘s adoptability; the
type and extent of the abuse or neglect that lead to foster care placement;
the parent‘s ability to rehabilitate; and economic factors.172 If the parent
meets his or her burden, a temporary termination of parental rights order
would be entered. If the court determines that the burden has not been
met, the parent can appeal on the temporary termination of parental
rights issue only. The appellate court could either affirm the decision or

169

A parent‘s ability to fully take advantage of the TTPR process is dependent
upon an expedited appellate process. Most state court rules either give priority
to all cases involving child custody or specifically provide for TPR appeals to
be handled in an expedited manner. In Minnesota, for example, all decisions
regarding juvenile protection matters shall be issued by the appellate court
within forty-five (45) days of the date the case is deemed submitted pursuant to
the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. MINN. R. JUV. PROT P. 47.06. See also,
National Center for State Courts, State Links for Appellate Procedure, available
at http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/CourTopics/StateLinks.asp?id=7&topic=App
Man.Courts.
170
Only final orders are appealable. Since the finding that sufficient evidence
exists to terminate parental rights is tantamount to a permanent denial of
parental rights, it should be appealable. A flowchart explaining this process is
appended to this article. This article does not discuss the standard of appellate
review that the court should apply.
171
NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.190 (2008) (stating that preponderance of the
evidence is the standard of proof necessary to restore parental rights). In 2008,
Washington state amended its statute to require a preponderance of the evidence
standard. S. 6792, § 1(c)(4) 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). See also, In re
T.E., 155 Vt. 172 (Vt. 1990) (holding proof by preponderance of the evidence is
sufficient to sustain parent‘s motion to vacate termination order). The
California, New York, Illinois and Georgia statutes, bills or proposals require
clear and convincing evidence.
172
For an explanation of each factor, see discussion infra Sections V(b)(i)-(vi).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2608614

Winter 2010]

Parents of Legal Orphans

351

remand for another hearing on the temporary termination of parental
rights issue.173
Once a temporary termination of parental rights order is entered, it
would remain in effect indefinitely174 and only the state child protection
agency and the child would have standing to seek to vacate or modify
the order. If a vacation or modification is is sought, the movant would
have to prove by preponderance of the evidence that there had been a
substantial and material change in circumstances related to the best
interest of the child and that the original order temporarily terminating
parental rights is no longer in the child‘s best interest.175 While a
finalized adoption decree would extinguish any rights to visitation or
support obligations176 (unless the parties have entered into post-adoption
contact agreement),177 the termination petition would be dismissed if a
173

The same options are available to the appellate court when a dispositional
order terminating parental rights is entered. See, e.g., In re Jelissa Ninette O.,
233 A.D.2d 874 (N.Y.A.D. 1996) (determining that request for suspended
judgment was erroneously denied and remitted matter to trial court for a new
dispositional hearing); In re Joshua BB., 27 A.D.3d 867 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding
lower court decision after finding sufficient evidence to deny request for
suspended judgment).
174
This is an aspect of the temporary termination of parental rights order that
differs from the New York suspended judgment statute. The Family Court Act
explicitly states that a suspended judgment is intended to be in effect for not
more than 12 months unless extended by the court. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 633
(2006). A suspended judgment is not intended to exist in perpetuity.
175
This is the standard used in some states when a party moves to modify a
custody order. See, e.g., In re Custody of Pearce, 456 A.2d 597, 602 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1983) (―Petitioner who seeks modification of custody order has burden to
prove that change of circumstances has occurred.‖).
176
But see ALASKA STAT.§ 47.10.089(e) and (j). Parents who voluntarily
relinquish their parental right may retain privileges with respect to the child,
including the ability to have future contact, communication, and visitation. If a
parent has retained one or more privileges, the court shall incorporate the
retained privileges in the termination order with a recommendation that the
retained privileges be incorporated in an adoption or legal guardianship decree.
A prospective adoptive parent or a guardian of a child may request that the court
decline to incorporate a privilege retained in a termination order and
recommended for incorporation in an adoption or guardianship decree. The
court may decline to incorporate a retained privilege if the person who retained
the privilege agrees with the request or if the court finds that is in the child‘s
best interest.
177
Post-adoption contact agreements are arrangements that allow for some kind
of contact between a child's adoptive family and members of the child's birth
family or other persons with whom the child has an established relationship,
such as a foster parent, after the child's adoption has been finalized. These
arrangements, sometimes referred to as cooperative adoption or open adoption
agreements, can range from informal, mutual understandings between birth and
adoptive families to written, formal contracts. Studies show that 4.5 years after
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child emancipates from or otherwise leaves the foster care system while
a temporary termination of parental rights order is in effect.178
B. THE TEMPORARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS (TTPR) HEARING
FACTORS
1. The Relationship Between The Child And The Parent
Studies have shown that maintaining emotional connections with
birth family is important to many foster children.179 Although most
courts use patterns of visitation as an indicator of parental commitment
when making termination of parental rights decisions, visitation alone
may not determine the presence of a parent-child relationship.180 Even
when a parent has not visited the child with frequency or regularity, they
may have an emotional connection that should be considered.
While states have begun to recognize the importance of biological
ties even after a child has been adopted181 there has not been a
concurrent acknowledgment that ties may be as important, if not more
so, before a child is adopted. Many states allow the adoptive parent to
enter into open adoption or enforceable post-adoption contact
agreements with the birth parents,182 thus allowing the child continuing
contact with the parents after adoption. However, parents whose children
have not been adopted rarely have the opportunity to maintain a
relationship that is legally sanctioned. Although some courts have
adoption, approximately ninety-eight percent of biological and adoptive parents
comply with the agreements and that nearly ninety-four percent are satisfied
with the open adoption process. Jeanne Etter, Levels of Cooperation and
Satisfaction in 56 Open Adoptions, 72 CHILD WELFARE 257, 261-263 (1993)
(examining the ability of biological and adoptive parents to cooperate in postadoption contact through the use of written contact agreements).
178
Similarly, courts have determined that the expiration of a suspended
judgment does not automatically result in the termination of parental rights and
the commitment of the child unless there is specific language in the court‘s
order providing for that result. Matter of Josh Ray O., 267 A.D.2d 1048
(N.Y.A.D. 1999).
179
See sources cited supra note 3.
180
See GINA M. SAMUELS, A REASON, A SEASON, OR A LIFETIME: RELATIONAL
PERMANENCE AMONG YOUNG ADULTS WITH FOSTER CARE BACKGROUNDS 5260 (2008).
181
See Jerica M. Berge, et al., Adolescents’ Feelings about Openness in
Adoption: Implications for Adoption Agencies, 85 CHILD WELFARE 1011, 10151017 (2006) (providing an overview of the evidence-based benefits of openness
in adoption).
182
Approximately 23 States currently have statutes that allow written and
enforceable contact agreements. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY,
POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN BIRTH AND ADOPTIVE
FAMILIES (2005), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_p
olicies/statutes/cooperative.cfm.
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ordered post-termination visitation when in the child‘s best interests,183
in most cases, courts have denied requests for continued contact after
parental rights have been terminated184 or the post-termination visitation
order has been vacated on appeal.185 Courts have also determined that
issues related to continued rights to visitation and post-termination
contact are for the legislature, not the courts.186
Even though the court may have the discretion to order visitation
between the parent and child after parental rights have been terminated
or the child protection agency may permit it, a parent who knows that
she or he has no legal rights may have little incentive to continue
visitation. If, however, parental rights are not permanently severed and
the parent has some hope for later reunification, the child is more likely
to reap the benefits associated with continued contact.187

183

In re Elise K., 33 Cal.3d 128 (1982), the trial court recognized that it would
have been detrimental to the child to completely sever her ties with her mother
and ordered bimonthly visits pending a final decree of adoption. In In re Kahlil
S., 35 A.D.3d 1164, 1165 (2006), the appellate court held that the Family Court
has discretion to order post-termination contact with a mentally ill or mentally
retarded biological parent. In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446 (W. Va., 1995)
(finding that when parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the
circuit court may consider whether continued visitation or other contact with the
abusing parent is in the best interest of the child).
184
In most states, once parental rights are terminated, the parent is no longer a
party to the proceeding and has no right to appear or move the court for
visitation. See, e.g., Amber R. v. Superior Court of Orange County, 43
Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 298-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that birth mother lacked
standing to seek visitation after her rights were terminated). In other cases, the
parent does not present sufficient evidence to support the granting of posttermination visitation. See, e.g., A.W. ex rel. B.W. v. Dep‘t of Children &
Families, 969 So. 2d 496, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding trial court
order prohibiting mother from having post-termination visitation or contact with
child where no parent-child relationship existed); In re Alyssa W., 619 S.E.2d
220, 224-25 (W. Va. 2005) (denying post-termination visitation where there was
no close emotional bond and where visits would have interfered with child‘s
permanent placement).
185
See, e.g., In re Jacob E., 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 15, 26-7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(voiding trial court order granting birth mother post-termination visitation);
Ament ex rel. C.R.H. v. C.H., 620 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D. 2000) (holding that
governing statutes do not vest any discretionary authority upon a court entering
a decree of parental termination to provide visitation rights or other privileges to
terminated parent).
186
See, e.g., In re C.R.H., 620 N.W.2d at 179-80 (―If they [open adoptions] are
to be established it is the Legislature that more appropriately should be called
upon to balance the critical social policy choices and the delicate issues of
family relations involved in such a determination.‖).
187
See sources cited supra note 3.
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Moreover, a temporary termination of parental rights order would
benefit children with incarcerated parents.188 These children have
increased difficulty maintaining meaningful parent-child relationships
prior to termination.189 However, when a relationship does exist,
continued visitation may be beneficial to both parties.190 Although there
may be little likelihood that the parent will resume parenting and a
termination of parental rights may be warranted, a permanent
termination of parental rights order may prohibit further visitation even
if the child‘s social worker later deems such contact to be in his or her
best interest.
In Bazzetta v. McGinnis, Michigan state prisoners brought a class
action lawsuit challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality of the state
department of corrections‘ regulation banning visitation between inmates
and their biological children as to whom parental rights had been
terminated.191 The Court of Appeals held that the regulation did not
violate their due process rights.192 Other state departments of corrections

188

In 2006, there were at least 29,000 children across the country in foster care
because of parental incarceration. PATRICIA E. ALLARD & LYNN D. LU,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, REBUILDING FAMILIES, RECLAIMING LIVES:
STATE OBLIGATIONS TO CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE AND THEIR INCARCERATED
PARENTS 4 (2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/
rebuilding_families_reclaiming_lives/. ―An estimated 809,800 prisoners of the
1,518,535 held in the nation‘s prisons at mid-year 2007 were parents of minor
children‖ (744,200 fathers and 65,600 mothers). LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA
M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR
CHILDREN 1-2 (Aug. 2008, rev. Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf. An estimated 10% of children with mothers in
prison are sent to foster homes. Dona Playton, Incarceration and the Sentences
for the Children Left Behind, 32 WYO. LAWYER, 36, 38 (Feb. 2009). See
generally ARLENE F. LEE ET AL., THE IMPACT OF THE ADOPTION AND SAFE
FAMILIES ACT ON CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS (Child Welfare
League of America 2005).
189
One study found that only about 13% of prisoners‘ children in long-term
foster care visit their incarcerated mothers; fewer than 5% visit their
incarcerated fathers. PLAYTON, supra note 188, at 39.
190
BERGE, supra note 181, at 1015-17.
191
Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 124 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 1997). See also Bazzetta v.
McGinnis, 133 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 1998) (clarifying the earlier decision).
192
―Viewed from a constitutional standpoint, if, as we now hold, the prison
officials properly limited the visitation rights of the prisoners because the
limitations were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, the effect
of these regulations upon persons outside the prison was largely irrelevant.‖
Bazzetta,124 F.3d at 780.
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have similar restrictions on visitation between biological parents and
their children after parental rights have been terminated.193
A temporary termination of parental rights order could be entered if
it is determined that the child has a relationship with the parent that
would be adversely affected by a permanent termination or if the child
would be psychologically damaged by the entry of the order. There are
cases where, despite this relationship, courts have terminated parental
rights because they were left with little choice. Examples include
circumstances where a parent, due to mental disability194 or other healthrelated issues, is unable to care for a child, or when a parent is
incarcerated. Despite a strong relationship with the child, parental rights
must be terminated in order to comply with ASFA deadlines and free the
child for adoption.195
A temporary termination order would allow the social services
agency time to secure an adoptive placement for the child but, if such
placement could not be found or the adoption is not finalized, permit the
parental rights to be ―reinstated‖ without additional court proceedings.
Restoring these rights upon emancipation acknowledges the reality that

193

See, e.g., Arizona Dep‘t of Corr., Department Order Manual: 911 Inmate
Visitation (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.adc.state.az.us/Hema_PO_DO
911.aspx.
194
See, e.g., People ex rel. R.M.S. v. T.S., 542 N.E.2d 1323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989);
In re Terry, 610 N.W.2d 563, 568-69 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re D.L.S., 432
N.W.2d 31, 37-38 (Neb. 1988); In re Joyce T., 65 N.Y.2d 39, 49 (N.Y. 1985);
In re Montgomery, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251-52 (N.C. 1984).
195
The Adoption Incentive Program, created in 1997 by the Adoption and Safe
Families Act, provides a financial reward to states that increase the number of
finalized adoptions from foster care. For each foster care adoption that exceeds
an established baseline number, the state receives $4,000, which can be used for
any child welfare purpose. 42 U.S.C. § 673(b) (2006). In 2003, Congress passed
the Adoption Promotion Act. Its key provision was the reauthorization of the
Adoption Incentive Program and, at the request of President George W. Bush,
the addition of bonus awards for adoptions of children ages nine and older.
Under this Act, states are eligible to receive financial awards for increasing the
number of children adopted from foster care above established baselines. States
are awarded $4,000 for each child adopted from foster care above the baseline;
$4,000 for each child age nine or older above the baseline; and if a state
qualifies for either of these bonuses, an additional $2,000 for each child who has
special needs and is under age nine above the baseline. The Act authorized up to
$43 million for bonuses for fiscal years 2004 through 2008, and was then
extended through 2013. Adoption Promotion Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 673(b)
(2006). U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PROGRAM INSTRUCTION
ACYF-CB-PI-04-03 (Mar. 23, 2004), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/progr
ams/cb/laws_policies/policy/pi/2004/pi0403.htm.
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youth reconnect with their biological parents after they leave foster care
and many return to live with their biological family.196
While rights are temporarily terminated, the court and the child
protection agency can decide whether continued visitation or other forms
of contact is in the child‘s best interest (i.e., not detrimental to the child).
While some may argue that such continued contact may interfere with
the development of a relationship with the pre-adoptive family or hinder
the adoption process, one recent study found that the child‘s connection
with his or her family of origin was not associated with an increased
length of time to adoption after parental rights had been terminated.197
Thus, contrary to expectations, plans to continue relationships with birth
families do not pose a realistic barrier to adoption.
2. The Child’s Attitude Towards Termination (And Adoption)
Many states currently recognize the right of older children to
participate in decisions regarding custody and adoption. In fact, the
majority of states require children over fourteen to consent to their
adoption and some require consent of children as young as ten.198
Furthermore, federal law requires states to apply procedural safeguards
to assure that any court or administrative body conducting a permanency
hearing consults, in an age-appropriate manner, with the child regarding
the proposed permanency or transition plan for the child.199
Despite this limited right of participation,200 in the majority of states,
children do not have standing to object to the termination of their

196

MARK E. COURTNEY & AMY DWORSKY, MIDWEST EVALUATION OF ADULT
FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 19, supra note
164, at 13-14; MARK E. COURTNEY, ET. AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF ADULT
FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 21, supra note
15, at 16.
197
CUSHING, supra note 37, at 698.
198
MARGARET C. JASPER, YOUR CHILD‘S LEGAL RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW 93
(Oceana Publications, Inc. 2003).
199
In 2006, Congress enacted the Child and Families Services Improvement
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006).
200
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Administration for
Children and Families Children‘s Bureau does not interpret the term ―consult‖
to require a court representative to pose a literal question to a child or require
the physical presence of the child at a permanency hearing. However, the
child‘s views on the child‘s permanency or transition plan must be obtained by
the court for consideration during the hearing. §8.3C.2c, Tit. IV-E, Foster Care
Maintenance Payments Program, State Plan/Procedural Requirements, Case
Review System, Permanency Hearings, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/j2ee
/programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/qaHistory.jsp?citID=58&id=1720.
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parents‘ parental rights.201 Although appointed an attorney or guardian ad
litem in the neglect proceeding,202 the child has little voice in the
resulting termination proceeding. To the extent that the child has an
attitude towards the termination, it is only evidence used by the court in
reaching the decision and is not dispositive. ―[K]nowledge that the child
will withhold consent to adoption is a relevant factor to be considered in
determining whether an order freeing the child for adoption is in the
child‘s best interest.‖203
At the temporary termination of parental rights hearing, the court
should consider how the child‘s attitude towards termination may affect
his or her psychological well-being if a permanent order is entered. An
older child‘s strong opposition to termination may forecast future actions
that will undermine any adoptive placement. Further, where the child
must consent to his or her own adoption, the child‘s feelings about the
termination may directly relate to adoptability.204 Considering the child‘s
opinion is consistent with recently enacted and proposed legislation that
allow children, as young as 10 years old, to petition to reinstate parental
rights.205
3. The Child’s Adoptability
A child‘s adoptability relates to whether his or her age, physical
condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing
to adopt him or her.206 A determination whether a child is adoptable may
201

See, e.g., In re Anthony S., 178 Misc.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998) (holding
that child was not a party to the termination proceeding and was not entitled to
seek relief from the order). But see W. VA. CODE, 49-6-5(6) (1992)
(―Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the court shall give
consideration to the wishes of a child fourteen years of age or older or otherwise
of an age of discretion as determined by the court regarding the permanent
termination of parental rights.‖); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. T97036005,
746 A.2d 379, 386 (2000) (holding that a child who is the subject of a petition
to terminate parental rights is a party to the proceeding and is entitled to a
hearing on the petition‘s merits).
202
See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 67 (2008),
available at www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/ch67.html. See also, LaShanda
Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in
Dependency Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605 (2009).
203
In re Frederick S., 678 N.Y.S.2d 448, 451 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998).
204
See, e.g., In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of E.M. and R.M.,
908 A.2d 297 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (vacating termination order where children
were unwilling to consent to adoption).
205
The minimum ages are: 10 years old in Minnesota; 12 years old in
Washington; 13 years old in Illinois; 14 years old in New York; and 15 years
old in Louisiana and Oklahoma.
206
See, e.g. In re: R.C., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 776, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (stating
that in determining adoptability, the focus is on whether a child‘s age, physical
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also consider whether an identified person has filed or intends to file an
adoption petition. However, this latter factor is not determinative
because 10 to 25 percent of anticipated adoptions do not finalize.207
Most state statutes do not require the court to consider adoptability
when making termination of parental rights decisions. In fact, the child
need not be in a pre-adoptive placement nor must an adoptive home be
identified prior to the termination of parental rights.208 Some argue that if
the government is going to terminate a child‘s ties to his or her natural
parents, then there must be reasonable certainty that the child is not
going to be left a legal orphan.209 Further, one study found that of
adopted children, those who had been placed with a pre-adoptive home
prior to termination were adopted much more quickly than those who
were not.210
Temporary termination of parental rights orders would be available
in all cases but would be particularly applicable when there is little
chance that the purpose for the termination, adoption, will be achieved.
Statistics show that older children, minority children and children with

condition and emotional state will create difficulty in locating a family willing
to adopt.); Jenny Cheung, Children‘s Law Center, Adoptability, 4 DEPENDENCY
LEGAL NEWS 24 (2009), available at http://www.clcla.org/Images/pdfs/pdfs_tra
in_caselaw/LegalUpv4i24.pdf.
207
HURLEY, supra note 78 (citing a national study). One study found that the
most frequent reasons for ambivalence regarding adoption are: lack of resources
to meet the child‘s needs (28%), loss of financial support (20%), loss of
casework services or support (19%), family not ready (18%), and child‘s
behavior (17%). CUSHING & GREENBLATT, supra note 37, at 699. Another
found the major reasons for the disruption of an adoptive placement to be:
child‘s behavior, foster parents‘ inability to provide services, abuse by foster
parents or other children in the pre-adoptive home, reappearance of a birth
parent, and reconsideration by foster parents. Rosemary J. Avery, Perceptions
and practice: Agency efforts for the hardest-to-place children, 22 CHILD. &
YOUTH SERVS. REV., 399, 408 (2000). When the family with whom the child
was living at the time of the termination proceeding does not adopt, the
likelihood of adoption is reduced by 66%. CUSHING & GREENBLATT, supra note
37, at 694.
208
See, e.g., In the Matter of K.C.F., L.T.F., and T.C.A, 928 A.2d 1046, 105354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (noting that the termination statute, 23 PA..CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2511, does not require children to be placed in a pre-adoptive home as a
precondition to termination of parental rights); In re Davonta V., 940 A.2d 733,
739 (Conn. 2008) (holding that termination may be in the child‘s best interest
even when adoption by new parents is not imminent).
209
See, e.g., In re Jayson T., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
210
CUSHING & GREENBLATT, supra note 37, at 698 (finding children who had
been placed prior to termination were adopted in a median of 11.63 months
compared to 20.47 months for those placed post-termination).
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special needs are less adoptable.211 Further, the longer that a child
remains in foster care, the less likely it becomes that he or she will exit
prior to legal emancipation.212 Although efforts should be made to secure
all children permanent homes, whenever possible,213 the court should
consider the child‘s adoptability when deciding whether to enter a
temporary termination of parental rights order.

211

Id., at 695 (providing overview of studies finding that older children are less
likely than younger children and infants to reach the goal of adoption prior to
aging out of foster care, that African American children were less than half as
likely to achieve permanence through guardianship or adoption as were children
of Caucasian backgrounds and that children with special needs are more likely
to experience delays and reduced likelihood of adoption prior to aging out of
care than youth without these problems); see also Evan B. Donaldson Adoption
Institute, Finding Families for African American Children: The Role of Race &
Law in Adoption from Foster Care 11-12 (2008), available at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/MEPApaper20080527.pdf
(finding that African American children wait in foster care for adoption an
average of nine months longer than White children); Susan P. Kemp & Jami M.
Bodonyi, Beyond Termination: Length of Stay and Predictors of Permanency
for Legally Free Children, 81 CHILD WELFARE 58, 69-72 (2002) (finding that
older children, boys and African American children were all significantly less
likely to achieve permanency than were Caucasian children); Richard P. Barth,
Effects of age and race on the odds of adoption versus remaining in foster care,
76 CHILD WELFARE 285, 294 (1997) (finding that African American children
are more than twice as likely to remain in foster care as to be adopted); AVERY,
supra note 207, at 400-01 (finding that children experiencing long delays in
placement are more likely to be older when they enter care, male, African
American and have substantial disabilities).
212
CUSHING & GREENBLATT, supra note 37, at 695 This phenomenon is known
as ―negative duration dependence‖ and it means that children are progressively
less likely to leave care as their time in care increases. NOONAN & BURKE,
supra note 165 at 242.
213
This article does not suggest that state agencies should cease efforts toward
providing permanency for all children. It does suggest, however, that agencies
and courts employ a broader view permanency. For some children, the emphasis
on adoption is misplaced because it focuses attention on one particular
permanency option rather than on the child‘s need for and right to permanent
family connections. Title IV-E of the Social Security Act requires states to make
reasonable efforts to place foster children in a timely manner in accordance with
a permanency plan and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize a
permanent placement when children cannot return home. 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(15)
(C)-(D). Despite this requirement, one study found that the children who were
most in need of enhanced recruitment efforts got the least because caseworkers
were not convinced of their eventual adoptability. AVERY, supra note 207, at
399; see also Rosemary J. Avery, et al., AdoptUsKids national photolisting
service: Characteristics of listed children and length of time to placement, 31
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 140, 151 (2009) (finding that states are using the
AdoptUsKids website to list their hardest-to-place children).
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Despite their decreased chances of being adopted, studies show that
children who are diagnosed with a disability are more likely to have their
parents‘ rights terminated.214 One study hypothesized that ―since children
diagnosed with a disability may be harder to care for, parents may be
more apprehensive about having their children return home and social
workers may try to expedite a permanent placement by quickly
terminating parental rights.‖215 Even if this is true and parents do not feel
that they are capable of caring for their disabled child, a temporary
termination of parental rights order would allow them to visit and
maintain a relationship while the child receives necessary care.
Admittedly, it is more difficult for a court to deem a child
unadoptable if the child is living in an adoptive placement at the time of
the termination proceeding. In In re Elise K., the child was ten years old
at the time of the termination proceeding and all parties agreed that
―there was no doubt the child is adoptable.‖216 However, in the four
years that the appeal was pending, the child‘s pre-adoptive placement
disrupted and she was deemed ―no longer adoptable.‖217 Similarly, in In
re Jayson T. and In re J.I., the California Court of Appeal reversed the
termination of parental rights judgment when the adoptive placement
disrupted and the children were no longer adoptable.218 ―[I]f they are not
adoptable, it would be a travesty of the juvenile dependency law to
terminate parental rights.‖219
In such cases, even if the court had litigated the issue at the trial
level, it is most likely that, since the children were in a pre-adoptive
placement, the court would have found them adoptable.220 Thus,
considering whether a child is not adoptable may be more relevant to the
court‘s decision than whether a child is deemed adoptable. Finding that a
child is adoptable should not weigh against entering a temporary
termination of parental rights order but finding a child not adoptable
should weigh towards entering a temporary termination of parental rights
order.
Even when a child is in a pre-adoptive placement, the court may
choose to enter a temporary termination of parental rights order as a way
to protect the child in the event that the adoption does not finalize. This
may be an appropriate safeguard even if the order does not allow for
214

NOONAN & BURKE, supra note 165, at 253.
Id.
216
In re Elise K., 33 Cal.3d at 144.
217
Id. at 148.
218
In re Jayson T., 97 Cal.App.4th at 91; In re J.I., 108 Cal.App. 4th 903, 915
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
219
In re Jayson T., 97 Cal.App.4th at 78.
220
Id. at 83 (noting that ―the issue of adoptability was not actually litigated at
the trial level- it was a nonissue‖).
215
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continued contact between the child and the biological parent, In Ronald
V., the birth mother‘s rights were terminated in anticipation of the
adoption of the child by the mother‘s former boyfriend.221 The preadoptive father and the mother agreed that she would have visitation
after the adoption was finalized.222 A year after the termination order was
entered and before the adoption was completed, the former boyfriend
died. The birth mother asked the court to modify the order terminating
her parental rights but the California Court of Appeal, First District,
Division 4, found that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion.223 As a
result, the child was left a legal orphan. In In re Jerred H., parental rights
were terminated so that the fourteen-year-old child could be adopted by
his stepfather.224 Eight months later, after he had been removed from the
pre-adoptive home, the child petitioned the court to reinstate parental
rights. The court denied the request on the ground that it lacked
jurisdiction.225 He, too, remained a legal orphan. If the court has the
option to enter a temporary termination of parental rights order in such
circumstances, fewer children will languish in and exit from the foster
care system as legal orphans.
4. The Type and Extent of the Abuse or Neglect That Lead to Foster Care
Placement
Studies show that parental rights are most often terminated due to
parental neglect rather than abuse.226 Furthermore, the neglect is usually
due to parental substance abuse.227 Despite the grounds for termination,
studies reveal that children who experience parental rights termination
221

In re Ronald V., 13 Cal. App. 4th 1803, 1805 (Cal. App. 1993).
Id.
223
Id.
224
In re Jerred H., 17 Cal.Rptr.3d at 482. The most common form of adoption is
that of children by stepparents. In these situations the adopting stepparent
assumes financial and legal responsibility for his/her spouse's child or children
and releases the noncustodial parent of parental responsibilities, including child
support. When a stepparent wishes to adopt a stepchild, the child's parents (the
stepparent's spouse and the noncustodial or absent parent) are usually both
required to consent to that adoption. In consenting to an adoption, only the
noncustodial parent relinquishes all parental rights and responsibilities, while
the petitioner‘s spouse retains his or her parental rights. U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS., CHILDREN‘S BUREAU, CHILD
WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, STEPPARENT ADOPTION (2004), available
at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/f_step.cfm.
225
In re Jerred H., 17 Cal.Rptr.3d at 483.
226
See Diane H. Schetky et al., Parents Who Fail: 51 Cases of Termination of
Parental Rights, 18 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 366 (1979); See also
Sandra J. Bishop et al., Serious Child Maltreatment in Massachusetts: The
Course of 206 Children Through the Courts, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 179,
181(1992).
227
WATTENBERG, supra note 163, at 414-415
222
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come from poor families where parents are involved in high-risk
behavior and have a history of problems, both physical and mental.228
The parents are also poorly educated,229 not regularly employed230 and
members of minority groups.231
Admittedly, there are circumstances when the permanent and
complete severance of parental rights is warranted. There are also cases
where parents do not challenge the petition and/or have little interest in
appealing an adverse decision. Ordering a temporary termination of
parental rights would not be applicable those situations. However, when
a parent does want to maintain a relationship with his or her child and
has an interest in a possible second chance at parenting, the court should
evaluate the circumstances that led to the initial removal and the grounds
for termination to determine whether a temporary termination of parental
rights order is appropriate.
In a recent New York appeals decision, the court held, ―[I]n the event
that parental rights are terminated after a finding that the parent is unable
by reason of mental illness or mental retardation to provide proper and
adequate care for his or her child or after a finding of permanent neglect,
Family Court may, in those cases in which the court deems it
appropriate, exercise its discretion in determining whether some form of
post[-]termination contact with the biological parent is in the best
interest of the child.‖232
Not only have courts given consideration to the underlying cause of
the maltreatment and subsequent termination, distinctions have been
made between voluntary and involuntary termination. In Theresa O. v.
Arthur P., the court permitted the biological mother to petition to adopt
her child after her rights had been terminated because had been no
finding of permanent neglect had been made against her.233 Further,
Virginia and Alaska law permit a natural parent whose parental rights to
a child have been voluntarily relinquished to seek reversal of the court
order terminating his or her parental rights if the child has not been
placed in a pre-adoptive home.234
5. The Parent’s Ability to Rehabilitate
228

NOONAN & BURKE, supra note 165 (discussing the results of three prior
studies analyzing which children are most likely to experience termination of
parental rights), at 244.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
232
In re Kahlil S.,830 N.Y.S.2d 625 No. 09742, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. App. Div.
Dec. 22, 2006).
233
In the Matter of Theresa O. v. Arthur P., 809 N.Y.S.2d.
234
VA CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (K) (2003); ALASKA STAT. §47.10.089(h) (2008).
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Despite a parent‘s sincere efforts to address the issues that led to the
child‘s placement in foster care, parental rights may be terminated before
he or she can fully rehabilitate. This may be done because the
government has determined that the child‘s continued foster care
placement will jeopardize his or her adoptability or because AFSA time
limits have been met. For parents with substance abuse issues, the AFSA
pressures can present particular problems.235
In In the Matter of Society for Seamen's Children v. Jennifer J., the
trial court terminated the parental rights of a substance abusing mother
who had completed a residential drug rehabilitation program and a
parenting skills course, maintained regular contact with her child and
secured an apartment.236 The mother's caseworker, who saw her weekly,
testified that the mother was making excellent progress toward being
reunited with her youngest child and, while the caseworker could not
recommend such a step at that time, anticipated that such a
recommendation could be made in the next four to five months if the
mother‗s progress continued.237 In such a case, though the grounds for a
termination may be met, a temporary termination of parental rights order
would provide incentive for the mother to continue working towards her
treatment goals.
This is also true for incarcerated parents. ―The fear - or reality - of
permanent loss of her children can send a mother into a downward spiral
of relapse and recidivism.‖238 Maintenance of family ties promotes

235

See Mickey J.W. Smith, ASFA and Substance Abuse: Understanding the
Issues Impacting Two Systems of Care, CHILD WELFARE PRACTICE UPDATE, 1-3
(Oct. 2003).
236
In the Matter of Society for Seamen's Children v. Jennifer J., 208 A.D.2d 849
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994). While the appellate court held that a suspended
judgment should have been entered and remanded the case, it did not find that
the court lacked sufficient evidence to sustain the petition.
237
Id. at 850.
238
Gail T. Smith, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: Its Impact on
Prisoner Mothers and Their Children, available at http://womenandprison.org/
motherhood/gail-smith.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2009). One former inmate
reflected on the probable outcome of a female prisoner after her parental rights
were terminated:
I would be willing to bet, knowing these women like I do, that
she didn‘t stay clean, that she didn‘t stay straight, she didn‘t
stay crime free and she didn‘t finish her parole. Because why
should she? You‘ve just taken every reason for her to turn her
life around, and taken it away from her. And told her that she
is the failure that she truly, ultimately believes she is, she has
no reason not to be anything else. But what you‘ve told her is
she has no value, she can‘t do anything, will never do
anything, and she deserved to lose her child.
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inmate morale, improves interactions between the staff and the inmates,
and strengthens connections with the community, which make the
inmates less likely to return to prison after release.239 Although the
decision on whether to enter a temporary termination of parental rights
order should be based on the best interests of the child, in most
circumstances it would be in the best interests of the child for his or her
biological parent not to be incarcerated or drug dependant. Thus, the
negative impact of a permanent termination on the parent may have an
impact on the child with an incarcerated parent.
Young parents may have similar challenges to those with
developmental disabilities as it relates to caring for their children—
inexperience, poor decision-making skills and lack of appreciation for
the consequences of their actions.240 Many teen mothers find it necessary
to voluntarily place their children with the state child protection services
or risk having them involuntarily removed.241 When the initial placement
Shannon Eddy, Termination of Parental Rights for Incarcerated Mothers 25-26
(Spring 2003) (unpublished student paper, University of Oregon School
of Law), available at http://www.law.uoregon.edu/faculty/cforell/docs/shannon
eddy.pdf.
239
ALLARD & LU, supra note 188, at 7 (quoting Office of the Inspector Gen.,
U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Criminal Calls: A Review of the Bureau of Prisons’
Management of Inmate Telephone Privileges ch. II, n.6 (1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9908/callsp2.htm#Background (quoting
reports provided to OIG by Bureau of Prisons)).
240
After controlling for all other demographic factors, one study found that
children born to teen mothers are significantly more likely to have an indicated
report of child abuse and neglect during their early childhood than are those
born to non-teen mothers. The study further suggested that children born to
younger teen mothers are at a greater risk of abuse or neglect than are children
born to older teen mothers. Robert M. Goerge, Allen Harden & Bong Joo Lee,
Consequences of Teen Childbearing for Child Abuse, Neglect, and Foster Care
Placement in KIDS HAVING KIDS: ECONOMIC COSTS AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF TEEN PREGNANCY 257, 276 (Saul D. Hoffman & Rebecca
A. Maynard eds., 2nd ed. 2008).
241
See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE 87-88 (2002) (―Social workers told fifteen-year-old Anisha Henry
that if she didn‘t relinquish custody of her baby boy, they would take him away
from her– with frightening consequences.‖). According to Professor Roberts,
Anisha Henry was a teen mother in the custody of New York‘s child welfare
agency, which was pressuring teen mothers in its custody to give up their babies
in an effort to relieve the shortage of foster homes. See also, YOUTH ADVOCACY
CTR., INC., CARING FOR OUR CHILDREN: IMPROVING THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
FOR TEEN MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 3 (1995), available at
http://www.youthadvocacycenter.org/pubs/reports.html#caring (finding that
nearly one third of the mothers and babies in survey sample were separated,
although they did not want to be, while waiting for foster care placement) and
Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We’ll Take Your Child: The Parents’
Fictional Voluntary Separation Decision and a Proposal for Change, 85 TENN.
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is due to minority or immaturity, it is more likely that, with time, the
deficiency will be corrected.242 However, overly rigid application of
ASFA timelines does not provide the opportunity for states to exercise
necessary patience with young parents.
In In the Matter of Vanessa S., the mother was fifteen when she gave
birth and voluntarily placed her child in foster care; she was twenty years
old when her parental rights were terminated.243 Nine years later, she
filed a motion to vacate the termination. At that time, she had reestablished a relationship with the child and was the primary caregiver
for her two younger daughters.244 The court, relying on its parens patriae
authority, vacated the order.245 The availability of a temporary
termination of parental rights option would have allowed the state to
remain compliant with ASFA by initiating the termination proceeding246

L. REV. 835, 836 (1998) (arguing that the voluntary label is often misleading
when applied to such placement agreements). For this reason, the TTPR option
is particularly germane when the teen mother is a ward of the state at the time of
the termination proceeding. In 1996, it was estimated that early childbearing and
closely linked factors lead to 23,000 children, an estimated five percent of all
those born to adolescent mothers each year, ending up in foster care. ROBIN
HOOD FOUNDATION, KIDS HAVING KIDS: A ROBIN HOOD FOUNDATION SPECIAL
REPORT ON THE COST OF ADOLESCENT CHILDBEARING 8 (Rebecca A. Maynard
ed., 1996), available at www.robinhood.org/media/7490/khk.pdf. Further, in
2004, teen childbearing cost the child welfare system $2.3 billion nationally.
SAUL D. HOFFMAN, BY THE NUMBERS: THE PUBLIC COSTS OF TEEN
CHILDBEARING 13 (2006), available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/cos
ts/pdf/report/BTN_National_Report.pdf.
242
See T.N.H. v. J.L.H., 2006-CA-001288-ME, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 325, at
*15 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2007) (vacating order where termination was based
on mother‘s past conduct as a juvenile with no consideration as to her future
parenting abilities).
In cases such as this, where a parent‘s age and emotional
immaturity undeniably contribute to her lack of parenting
skills, we believe that termination must not be based solely on
the parent‘s prior behavior without some objective assessment
of her psychological and mental capacity to develop the
abilities to effectively parent a child.
Id. at *16.
243
In the Matter of Vanessa S., 111 Misc. 2d 313, 317 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
244
Id. at 318.
245
Id. at 315-319.
246
On October 20, 2008, the author received the following response from ACF
regarding whether a state could initiate or join the proceeding but fail to seek
resolution and still be in compliance with Federal law. ―Yes. According to the
preamble to the Final Rule published in the Federal Register on January 25,
2000 (65 FR 4062, middle column) which implemented the requirements of
Public Law 105-89, the Administration for Children and Families‘ authority
does not extend into the finalization of proceedings for termination of parental
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while also recognizing the impact of the parent‘s age and emotional
immaturity on her lack of parenting skills. Having a TTPR option would
also negate the necessity for a subsequent proceeding to reestablish the
parent-child relationship.
6. Economic Factors
As previously discussed, in many states, the obligation to support a
child and the right of the child to inherit intestate cease when parental
rights are terminated.247
Extinguishing the right of the child to inherit from its
terminated parent. . . seems not to further the primary
goal of the termination statutes – protecting the interests
of the child – but rather to add additional injury to
children who already suffer from inadequate parenting
and very likely the additional burdens of poverty and
minority status as well.248
A temporary termination of parental rights order would address the
problems previously discussed by significantly decreasing, if not totally
eliminating, the number of children who leave foster care without legal
parents. Moreover, while a temporary termination of parental rights
order was in effect, the child would remain eligible for continued child
support and retain his or her inheritance rights since there would be no
permanent termination order. Thus, a temporary termination of parental
rights order would benefit both children in the foster care system and
those who exit prior to adoption.
Although considering economic factors may serve to adversely
impact minority parents, studies reveal that African American children
and children of Hispanic descent have a significantly lower risk of being
the subject of termination proceedings.249 So as not to discriminate
against poor and minority parents, consideration of economic factors
should not be determinative but rather should only be one aspect of the
court‘s reasoning during the temporary termination of parental rights
hearing.
rights as this is a matter of State law.‖ Email from Sandi McCloud to the author
(Oct. 20, 2008) (on file with the VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L.).
247
See sources cited supra notes 48-50.
248
BROWN, supra note 47, at 143.
249
NOONAN & BURKE, supra note 165, at 253 (further noting that African
American and Hispanic children are also less likely to be reunited with their
parents). While black parents‘ rights are less likely to be terminated, Dorothy
Roberts, in her book SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE,
argues that blacks are more likely to be affected by an expedited termination
process. ROBERTS, supra note 241, at 159.
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Appellate courts, when reviewing termination orders, have
recognized that the loss of inheritance and support rights may not be in
the child‘s best interest.250 In a recent case, the District Court of Appeal
of Florida, Fourth District, authorized the trial court to reopen a
termination case after the father‘s death to determine whether it was in
the child‘s best interest to enter a final order terminating parental
rights.251 In that case, the father‘s parental rights had been terminated
and he was killed during the pendency of his appeal; therefore, a TPR
may have had adverse legal consequences for the child in regard to any
interest she may have had in a wrongful death action. ―[T]he State‘s
interest in vindicating judgments presumed correct must give way to that
paramount concern, the best interests of the child, especially as to
collateral property rights related to her father that might be lost by
upholding a final judgment terminating his parental rights.‖252
Although the fact that financial support would be eliminated by
termination is an inadequate reason, by itself, to refuse to terminate
parental rights, considering the economic effect that termination may
have on the child is appropriate at the temporary termination of parental
rights stage.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the number of ―legal orphans‖ with no likelihood of adoption
increases, courts will become inundated with cases involving children
and parents who want a second chance at a legally recognized parentchild relationship. The legal system must respond to this phenomenon by
continuing to devise ways to reestablish parent-child relationships when
in the child‘s best interest. While states have begun to enact legislation
that allows parental rights to be reinstated, courts continue to be
unpredictable in their response and there remain few legal pathways to
restoring parental rights. Handicapped by the permanency of termination
of parental rights orders, courts have few options available to them after
the order has been entered. Temporary termination of parental rights
orders address the need to provide safe and permanent homes for
children while also having the flexibility to address the best interests of
the child as those interests evolve.

250

See, e.g., In the Matter of David Carlton Stephenson, 513 So. 2d 614, 617
(Ala. 1987) (reversing termination order where child‘s best interests were not
protected by loss of right to receive support from his father); A.B. v. State of
Alaska Dep‘t of Health and Social Servs., 7 P.3d 946, 955 (Alaska 2000); In re
G.A.Z., 2002 WL 575640, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2002).
251
C.A. v. Dep‘t of Child. & Families, 16 So. 3d 888, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
4th, 2009).
252
Id. at 890.
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While a child is in the foster care system, periodic hearings are held
in which the court has the authority to enter individualized orders that
further the child‘s best interests.253 In these proceedings, there is
recognition that each child is different and his or her best interests must
be determined on a case-by-case basis. Only when a termination of
parental rights petition is filed does the court only have two options
available– terminate parental rights or dismiss the petition.254 This ―one
size fits all‖ approach to resolving issues related to child neglect and
child custody is not responsive to the needs of the children involved in
the case. As the best interests of the child fluctuate along a continuum,
courts must have an expanded range of options available in order to
address those interests.

253

The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (2009), requires
that the status of each child in out-of-home care be reviewed at least once every
6 months by either a court or an administrative review.
254
As previously noted, in New York, there is a third dispositional alternative,
suspended judgment. See sources cited supra note 65.
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APPENDIX A
The following is a series of flowcharts illustrating the proposed trial
and appellate process for entering a temporary termination of parental
rights order (TTPR).

Parent
appeals
(expedited
appeal)

Government files
TPR petition

Government
meets burden

TTPR
requested
by Parent

Government
does not
meet burden

No TTPR
requested
by Parent

Petition
dismissed
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